In re Extradition of Frank Cotroni
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Thurlow and
Pratte JJ.—Ottawa, December 20, 1973.
Extradition—Judicial review—Jurisdiction re bail pending
review—Jurisdiction to order applicant to remain in Canada
pending review—Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s.
2(f)—Federal Court Act, s. 28(1).
There is no inherent or implied power in the Court to
grant bail or to order by mandamus or otherwise to compel
the Extradition Judge to grant bail or to order the applicant
to remain in Canada pending a section 28 proceeding in an
application to set aside a warrant issued under the Extradi
tion Act.
APPLICATION.
COUNSEL:
K. C. Binks, Q.C., and G. M. Legault for
applicant.
L. P. Landry for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Binks, Chilcott and Simpson, Ottawa, for
applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
JACKETT C.J. (orally)—This is an interlocuto
ry application in a section 28 proceeding that
the Court
(a) set bail for the applicant pending the hear
ing of the said appeal, or, in the alternative,
(b) order by mandamus, or otherwise compel,
the Extradition Judge to grant bail to the
applicant, or
(c) make such order as is necessary and
appropriate to set the applicant at liberty
pending hearing of the said appeal in accord
ance with the applicant's right to reasonable
bail as set out in paragraph 2W of the Canadi-
an Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 [see R.S.C.
1970, Appendix III], or
(d) order that the applicant, Frank Cotroni,
remain in Canada and not be delivered up to
the United States Government until the hear
ing or other disposition of this said appeal.
The section 28 proceeding is an application to
set aside a warrant issued under the Extradition
Act.
Counsel for the applicant concedes that there
is no statutory provision that expressly confers
on this Court jurisdiction to make any of the
orders sought prior to the time when the Court
has reviewed the decision of the Extradition
Judge and is in a position to exercise the powers
conferred by section 52(d) of the Federal Court
Act. He contends, however, that there must be
an implied or inherent power to grant bail and to
make the other orders sought in the interim.
We are all of opinion that there is no such
implied or inherent power in the Court.
The application will be dismissed.
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