T-4100-77
Hillsdale Golf & Country Club Inc. (Petitioner)
v.
The Queen (Respondent)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, December 18;
Ottawa, December 22, 1978.
Practice — Costs — Expropriation proceeding — Pro
nouncement awarding costs including fees and disbursements
of experts and costs of exhibits — Appraisal report prepared
for negotiations for compensation for expropriated golf course
— Expropriation abandoned five years later but subject to
perpetual servitude prohibiting residential development —
Second appraisal report prepared determining adverse finan
cial effects of expropriation and calculating diminution of
property value because of servitude — Petition for directions
or for order prescribing global sum in place of costs —
Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 16, s. 27 —
Federal Court Rule 344(7), Tariff A, s. 4(2), Tariff B, s. 2(2).
This is a petition for directions concerning costs in these
expropriation proceedings or for an order prescribing the pay
ment of a global sum in the place of costs. The subject
property, a luxury golf course, was expropriated for the con
struction of Mirabel Airport. Plaintiff, preparing for the
negotiations to determine the compensation payable, expended
a substantial sum for a thorough and detailed evaluation report.
The expropriation, after five years' negotiation, was abandoned,
but subject to the imposition of a perpetual servitude prohibit
ing any use of the property for residential development. A new
and entirely different appraisal report became necessary to
determine the adverse financial effects of the expropriation
during that five-year period and to calculate the diminution in
value of the property because of the imposition of the servitude.
The eventual judgment awarded $180,000 less $45,000 credit
for taxes during the five-year period the Crown owned the land
due to the expropriation, with "costs including fees and dis
bursements of experts and costs of exhibits."
Held, the plaintiff's disbursements in respect of its expert
witnesses are to be taxed. The pronouncement is quite clear
that the question of fees and disbursements of experts and costs
of exhibits was intended to be included as an item in the bill of
costs. In determining what is a reasonable amount, all the
surrounding circumstances should be taken into account by the
taxing officer. The appropriate direction to be given is that,
while it would be inappropriate to tax the entire amount paid
for the two appraisal reports in the costs to be paid by
defendant on a party and party basis, especially as half of that
amount was of no direct use in the present proceedings, a
substantial part of the amount expended could be considered as
reasonable, especially that part pertaining to the actual pro
ceedings brought. The pronouncement did not provide for a
lump sum and the Court cannot now prescribe one as it would
constitute a change in the pronouncement. The Court directs,
without attempting to make an order establishing the amount
of the costs, that the low and unrealistic sums provided in the
tariff be increased so as to provide part, but not full, compensa
tion to plaintiff for the disbursements for experts and for
counsel's fees in these proceedings.
Smerchanski v. Minister of National Revenue [1979] 1
F.C. 801, applied.
APPLICATION.
COUNSEL:
Pierre Pinard for petitioner.
Gilles Fafard for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Viau, Bélanger, Hébert, Mailloux, Pinard,
Denault & Legault, Montreal, for petitioner.
de Grandpré, Colas, Amyot, Lesage, Des-
chènes & Godin, Montreal, for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
WALSH J.: This is a petition for directions con
cerning costs in these proceedings or for an order
prescribing the payment of a global sum in place
of costs. The problem of what constitutes appropri
ate sums to be allowed in lieu of taxed costs and
the proper procedure to be followed for allowing
them has become a difficult and controversial
question which frequently misleads counsel for the
parties in view of what was, at least until recently,
conflicting jurisprudence. Amounts substantially
in excess of the tariff, which in my view is unreal
istic and outdated by contemporary standards save
for the relatively few cases in this Court where the
amounts involved and the time and effort expend
ed are small were allowed by Kerr J. in the case of
Aladdin Industries Inc. v. Canadian Thermos
Products Limited', and in a judgment I rendered
in the case of Crelinsten Fruit Company v. Mari
time Fruit Carriers Co. Ltd. [1976] 2 F.C. 316, in
which although I substantially reduced the
amounts claimed calculated on a time basis the
amount involved was still greatly in excess of the
tariff. I adopted the same policy in the case of The
' [1973] F.C. 942.
Trustee Board of the Presbyterian Church in
Canada v. The Queen Court Nos. T-908-74
[[1977] 2 F.C. 107] and A-404-74 a judgment
dated December 2, 1976, which unlike the other
two cases referred to was an expropriation action
although one which proceeded under the new Act. 2
In the Crelinsten case I had referred to a Court of
Appeal judgment in the case of Crabbe v. Minister
of Transport 3 , as well as to the Thermos case and
also to the Court of Appeal judgment in the case
of Bourque v. National Capital Commission 4 in
which Jackett C.J. at page 530 after referring to
paragraph 4(2) of Tariff A and paragraph 2(2) of
Tariff B of the Federal Court Rules stated in
parenthesis:
(It is true that this provision contemplates a direction from the
Court within a time that has expired in this case but we have no
doubt that such time would be extended, in the circumstances
of this case, under Rule 3(c).)
The question was also raised in the case of Benmar
Development Corporation v. The Queen Court No.
T-935-71, an expropriation similar to the present
case in that it was brought under the former
Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-19 and that
instead of dealing with the amount to be allowed
in an expropriation was concerned with the
amount to be awarded as a result of the subse
quent abandonment of same by the Crown. I had
rendered the judgment in that case dated Decem-
ber 17, 1971, which allowed $265,000 less
amounts which had already been paid and interest
and merely concluded "the whole with costs". In
due course costs were taxed by the taxing officer,
including costs of experts (who happened to be the
same experts as in the present case) in the amount
of $33,641.99 which was treated as a disburse
ment, the total taxation coming to $36,066.99. An
application for revision of this taxation was made
by defendant and an order made by Addy J.
requiring that further particulars be furnished and
adjourning the revision sine die. After the particu
lars were furnished a settlement was made where
by the sum of $27,687.19 was paid by agreement
between the parties.
2 R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 16.
3 [1973] F.C. 1091.
4 [1972] F.C. 527.
In the recent Court of Appeal case of Smer-
chanski v. Minister of National Revenues Jackett
C.J. sitting alone on an application for an order
concerning costs gave the whole question of proce
dure careful consideration and in an Appendix
criticized the decisions in the Crelinsten Fruit and
Thermos cases (supra). This judgment together
with the Crabbe judgment (supra) must be con
sidered as a definitive finding on the question of
procedure and quantum. I have also had the ben
efit of reading the recent judgment of Thurlow
A.C.J. in the case of Parsons v. The Queen Court
No. T-463-77 in which he concluded that on the
material before him it would be difficult to regard
the appropriate allowance as capable of estimation
save on a rough and ready basis but that he was
satisfied that the $35 provided for in paragraph
4(1) of Tariff A was not appropriate for that case
and that paragraph 4(2) should apply. He then
directed that pursuant to Rule 344(7) and sub-
paragraph 2(2)(a) of Tariff B disbursements to an
expert witness should be taxed at a reasonable
amount for the services performed in preparing for
and giving evidence at trial due regard being had
to the amount of damages recovered in the action,
to the question of reasonableness in the circum
stances of the extent of the time spent by the
witness in preparing himself to give evidence and
to the reasonableness of the rate to be paid for
such time.
Rule 344(7) reads as follows:
Rule 344... .
(7) Any party may
(a) after judgment has been pronounced, within the time
allowed by Rule 337(5) to move the Court to reconsider the
pronouncement, or
(b) after the Court has reached a conclusion as to the
judgment to be pronounced, at the time of the return of the
motion for judgment,
whether or not the judgment includes any order concerning
costs, move the Court to make any special direction concerning
costs contemplated by this Rule, including any direction con
templated by Tariff B, and to decide any question as to the
application of any of the provisions in Rule 346. An application
under this paragraph in the Court of Appeal shall be made
before the Chief Justice or a judge nominated by him but either
party may apply to a Court composed of at least 3 judges to
review a decision so obtained.
5 Supra, page 801.
Paragraph 4(2) of Tariff A reads:
4. ...
(2) In lieu of making a payment under section 3, there may
be paid to a witness who appears to give evidence as an expert a
reasonable payment for the services performed by the witness
in preparing himself to give evidence and giving evidence.
Paragraph 2(2) of Tariff B reads:
2. The following may be allowed unless the Court otherwise
directs:
(2) Disbursements:
(a) all disbursements made under Tariff A may be
allowed, except that payments to a witness under para
graph 4(2) may only be allowed to the extent directed by
the Court under Rule 344(7).
(b) such other disbursements may be allowed as were
essential for the conduct of the action.
Section 3 reads:
3. No amounts other than those set out above shall be
allowed on a party and party taxation, but any of the above
amounts may be increased or decreased by direction of the
Court in the judgment for costs or under Rule 344(7).
With regard to revision of judgments Rule
337(5) and (6) is to be referred to.
As I understand the present state of the law
following the Smerchanski judgment is as follows:
1. If the Court in rendering judgment merely gives
judgments for costs to be taxed it cannot subse
quently substitute a lump sum unless by way of
reconsideration of the judgment for a reason that
falls within one of the classes of a case to be found
in Rule 337(5) or (6).
2. In dealing with the subsequent taxation of costs
pursuant to section 3 of Tariff B and Rules 344(7)
and 350(3) Jackett C.J. states at page 803:
In my view this cannot change the nature of the order that may
be sought as set out in the notice of motion without the
acquiescence of the opposing party and the Court and it cannot
be said that there was any acquiescence on the part of the
opposing party during the hearing of this application.
While this is the rule it is not applicable in the
present case where counsel for defendant at the
hearing of the present motion before me
acquiesced to the application of section 3 of Tariff
B and Rule 344(7) as well as to the waiver of any
delay for presentation of a motion for revision of
the judgment pursuant to Rule 337, conceding that
the Tariff does not represent reasonable remunera
tion either for the experts or for plaintiff's counsel
in the particular circumstances of this case.
3. With respect to the application of Rule 350(3)
which reads as follows:
Rule 350... .
(3) Where, for any reason, there would otherwise be a delay
in the taxation of a bill of costs, if a judge finds that he can do
so without interfering with his judicial duties, he may tax the
bill of costs as if he were a prothonotary.
this is intended to be used only in the case where a
judge is sitting at a place where there is no author
ized taxing officer available or if it is some compa
rable exceptional case and does not entitle a party
as of right to taxation of costs by a judge instead
of taxation by a regular taxation officer. This is
not an issue in the present case where there is a
regular taxation officer available in Montreal.
4. Any special Court directions changing the tariff
amount contemplated by section 3 of Tariff B
should be obtained before the taxation procedure
is proceeded with so that such direction will be
available to support the amounts claimed in the
bill of costs at the time of the taxation.
5. Reading Rule 344(7) with Rule 337(5) it is
contemplated that an application for a direction
increasing costs should be made while the matter
is sufficiently fresh in the mind of the Court that
the Court is in a position to appreciate whether
there were present in the particular case circum
stances justifying a departure from the normal
tariff amount.
In the present case unlike the Smerchanski case
there has been no unreasonable delay. The judg
ment was pronounced on October 3, 1978, and the
matter is still fresh in my mind. Moreover, as
already indicated defendant's counsel acquiesces
so that no formal motion under Rule 337 is neces
sary. The motion for directions before me requests
the Court to render whatever order is deemed
advisable concerning the adjudication of costs,
which would include the revision of the pronounce
ment if necessary.
6. In expressing his views as to the reasons for
making a direction such as is sought here the
learned Chief Justice stated at page 805:
Nothing has been put forward to suggest that there was
anything in the conduct of the appeal to warrant any increase
in the party and party tariff. While there is no principle with
reference to the basis for ordinary party and party costs that is
apparent to me from a study of the relevant Rules, it does seem
to be clear that party and party costs are not designed to
constitute full compensation to the successful party for his
solicitor and client costs.
and again at page 806:
If Federal Court party and party costs are not designed to
provide full reimbursement, as it seems to me, what is intended
is that they be made up of the completely arbitrary amounts
fixed by or in accordance with the rules subject to variations
(where authorized) based on factors arising out of the conduct
of the particular proceeding.
7. As appears by the Appendix of the Smerchan-
ski case it is the view of the Chief Justice that
Rule 344(7) authorizes applications for special
directions to be carried out on the taxation of costs
but does not authorize applications to change the
pronouncement of a judgment or a judgment after
it has been signed.
8. Again from the Appendix on a review of taxa
tion under Rule 346(2) the Crabbe case decided
that the Court can merely decide whether the
taxing officer erred in performing his duties but
can neither change the Court's judgment nor make
a directional order contemplated by Rule 344 or
section 3 of Tariff B.
It is now necessary to review briefly the very
unusual situation which arose in the present case.
The property in question was a luxury and expen
sive golf course in the area expropriated for con
struction of the Mirabel Airport north of Mon-
treal. Golf courses present exceptionally difficult
problems in evaluation and plaintiffs retained the
services of Warnock. Hersey who prepared a very
thorough and detailed evaluation report. At the
time the Crown was offering approximately
$2,000,000 for the property in question whereas,
as a result of the report plaintiff was seeking
approximately $4,000,000. About $25,000 of the
Warnock Hersey account rendered in due course
to plaintiffs was for this work and certainly the
amount in issue would justify the expenditure of
this much time in preparation for negotiations as
to the amount to be awarded and in anticipation of
the likelihood of eventual court proceedings to
establish the amount. Negotiations went on for
nearly five years during which the members of the
golf club were not certain how long they would be
able to operate it as such, with resultant loss of
new members' entrance fees, and delay of neces
sary capital expenditures which subsequently
became more costly. Eventually in September
1974 the Minister of Transport decided to aban
don r the expropriation which had taken place in
1969, but subject to the imposition of a perpetual
servitude prohibiting any use of the property for
residential development. This would enable the
golf club to retain ownership of the property and
be able to continue to operate until anticipated
increases in taxation would make this impossible,
but subject to the severe handicap of not being
able to sell any of the peripheral property around
the golf course for residential development and
additional revenue.
The experts then had to prepare an entirely
different type of appraisal report which they did
again at great length and in great detail, making a
study of the demise of golf courses in the Montreal
area and the value which the bare land used by
them had reached for taxation purposes at the date
they could no longer continue, making a study of
zoning regulations in the Mirabel area and prop
erty values there with the view of attempting to
estimate at what time in the future taxation of the
subject property would have reached the point
where use as a golf course would have to cease,
attempting to foresee the possible value of the
property at such date, calculating the present
worth, examining membership trends and loss of
revenue from entrance fees and members' accounts
during the period of uncertainty between the
expropriation and the abandonment, calculating
the increased cost of deferred capital expenditures
during this five-year period, and trying to calculate
the diminution in value of the property as a result
of the servitude prohibiting any residential de
velopment thereon. This was an entirely different
approach and involved very extensive additional
research and study by the experts resulting in
additional costs to plaintiff of some $25,000. As a
result of this study the amount claimed on the
abandonment was now $758,180 while all the
Crown was prepared to offer was $49,165.32,
again a very wide discrepancy as a result of which
plaintiff instituted the present proceedings.
The eventual judgment, although finding the
report of the experts as to the amount to be
awarded on abandonment too theoretical, as a
result of being based on too many variables and
imponderables nevertheless found it of some use
and the judgment awarded $180,000 less $45,000
credit for taxes which had been paid by the Crown
to the exoneration of plaintiff during the time the
property was owned by the Crown due to the
expropriation.
The pronouncement of judgment read:
Judgment in favour of Plaintiff for $135,000.00 with interest
from September 23, 1974 and costs including fees and disburse
ments of experts and costs of exhibits.
It will be noted that the judgment did not simply
award costs but specifically provided for the fees
and disbursements of experts and costs of exhibits.
In rendering this pronouncement I did so specifi
cally bearing in mind the difference between the
former Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-19,
under which the proceedings were conducted and
the new Act R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 16. Under
the former Act section 33 dealing with costs read
as follows:
33. The costs of and incident to any proceedings hereunder
shall be in the discretion of the Court, which may direct that
the whole or any part thereof shall be paid by the Crown or by
any party to such proceeding.
I believe that the words "incident to" are signifi
cant as are the words "in the discretion of the
Court", and would seem to foresee costs in excess
of what would normally be provided in the Tariff
provided the Court deemed this advisable. While
nothing specifically is said about experts, disburse
ments for them might possibly be considered as
"incident to proceedings". In the new Act section
27 provides:
27. (1) The Crown shall pay to each person entitled to
compensation under this Part an amount equal to the legal,
appraisal and other costs reasonably incurred by him in assert
ing a claim for such compensation, except any such costs
incurred after the institution of any proceedings under
section 29.
as a result of which all the experts' costs and legal
costs prior to the institution of the present pro
ceedings now form part of the claim and should be
so included instead of being taxed after judgment.
Moreover section 36 provides that where the
amount awarded is greater than the offer made by
the Crown and unless a claim is found to be
unreasonable costs shall be determined on a solici
tor and client basis and paid by the Crown. While
I am not of course suggesting in any way that this
Act is applicable to the present proceedings as
such, the equitable principles enunciated therein
were certainly in the mind of counsel for both
parties and of the Court which accounts for the
wording of the pronouncement, which followed the
wording in the conclusion of the statement of
claim, in specifically providing that costs should
include the fees and disbursements of experts and
costs of exhibits none of which had been claimed
as items to be included in the award in the state
ment of claim as would have been done under the
new Act.
With respect to the question of fees and dis
bursements of experts and costs of exhibits I
believe that the pronouncement is quite clear that
this was intended to be included as an item in the
bill of costs and there is therefore no need for a
reconsideration under Rule 337 on this issue
although it may be necessary by way of explana
tion as to what I had in mind to specifically make
a direction pursuant to Rule 344(7) that pursuant
to paragraph 4(2) of Tariff A the experts should
be allowed "a reasonable payment for the services
performed by the witness in preparing himself and
giving evidence". This gives authority to the taxing
officer under section 2(2)(a) of Tariff B to allow
as a disbursement such "reasonable" payment. In
determining what is a reasonable amount all the
surrounding circumstances should be taken into
account by the taxing officer. The account of
Warnock Hersey in this case amounts to
$50,478.03 of which, as already stated about
$25,000 was in preparation for the negotiation of
settlement or a trial of the matter on the issue of
the value of the property. In the long run this
evidence proved unnecessary, but this is no fault of
the experts nor of plaintiff's counsel who had
instructed them to prepare on this basis, the
change in the nature of the claim being the result
of the abandonment five years later by the expro
priation authorities which led to an entirely differ
ent appraisal involving approximately $25,000.
The account is supported in great detail by exhib
its showing the time spent, the average daily fees
varying between $114 and $185 and the hourly
rates of the appraisal teams varying from $10 an
hour for juniors to approximately $12 for techni
cians, $15 for intermediates and $35 for seniors.
These charges do not appear to be excessive or
unreasonable. However in the result whereby the
net award was only increased by some $85,000
over the Crown's offer the charge would clearly be
out of line with the results obtained. It would be
inappropriate for the Court to make a finding as to
whether as a consequence the charges made by the
experts to plaintiff should be or would be reduced.
This is a matter for possible negotiation between
them. It appears to me that the appropriate direc
tion to be given to the taxing officer in this case is
therefore that while it would be inappropriate to
tax the entire amount of $50,478.03 as a disburse
ment to the experts in the costs to be paid by
defendant on a party and party basis especially as
one half of this was of no direct use in the present
proceedings it would certainly seem that a sub
stantial part of it could be considered as "reason-
able", especially that part pertaining to the actual
proceedings brought.
When we come to the question of costs of
plaintiff's attorneys the situation is more difficult
in that the pronouncement did not provide for a
lump sum and the Court cannot now do this as this
would constitute a change in the pronouncement.
The fact that the Court did not do so was perhaps,
as defendant's counsel admits the result of an error
in law induced by him. He conceded that at some
stage during the course of the trial plaintiffs
counsel suggested that judgment be sought from
the Court to award costs in a lump sum and that
defendant's counsel indicated that he did not con
sider this necessary as the question of what con
stituted reasonable fees for plaintiffs counsel
could be taken care of on taxation. In any event no
such order was sought but had it been sought I
would readily have acceded to it. I seriously doubt
however whether this constitutes a matter which
would justify the variation of the pronouncement
by Rule 337(5)(b) on the ground that it is "[a]
matter that should have been dealt with [which]
has been overlooked or accidentally omitted".
However I do not believe that the jurisprudence
excludes me from granting the motion for direc
tions and giving special directions to the taxing
officer concerning costs. I am not dealing with a
review of a taxation nor attempting to make direc
tions under Rule 344(7) on such a review as in the
cases of Crelinsten Fruit or Thermos which proce
dure was found to be unacceptable in the Crabbe
and Smerchanski cases, nor am I attempting to
make an order establishing the amount of costs
myself as was sought in the Smerchanski case
rather than having same taxed by the taxing offi
cer. I merely propose, with the approval of counsel
for defendant, to give certain directions to the
taxing officer to enable him to reach a conclusion
increasing the amounts set out in the Tariff by
applying guidelines which I will now set out.
The account of plaintiff's counsel for $25,000
outlines in detail extensive services commencing in
1971. At least half of these services were in con
nection with consultations with his clients, experts,
representatives of the Minister, town officials, and
others, and negotiations attempting to establish
the amount to be paid on expropriation, and it
would be unreasonable to conclude that since most
of this was a waste of time as the expropriation
eventually was abandoned and the action had to
eventually be brought on an entirely different basis
plaintiffs counsel should not be paid for this.
However we are taxing costs which must be taxed
on the proceedings which were eventually brought.
As in the case of the experts' fees it would be
inappropriate for me to attempt to say whether the
sum of $25,000 is an appropriate fee for counsel to
charge when the eventual judgment in favour of
plaintiff was for a net amount of $135,000, only
some $85,000 more than the offer. It is of interest
to look at Rule 89(1) of the Regulations of the
Bar of Quebec establishing a proposed tariff for
expropriation matters which reads as follows:
89. (1) In expropriation matters, the suggested extrajudicial
fees are as follows:
(a) A fee of one per cent (1%) of the amount of the
indemnity (save in cases where the advocate is already
entitled to an equivalent fee under the tariff of judicial
costs), plus
(b) A fee of ten per cent (10%) of the difference between the
amount of the indemnity and the amount of the initial offer
made by the expropriator or, when the expropriator has
made no offer, the difference between the amount of the
indemnity and the minimum amount established by the
experts acting for the expropriator.
If this tariff were applied the appropriate
extrajudicial fee would then be in the neighbour
hood of $9,850. This tariff is of course in no way
binding on this Court. The taxing officer should
bear in mind, moreover, the admonition of Jackett
C.J. in the Smerchanski case that party and party
costs are not designed to provide full reimburse
ment, the tariff costs not being designed to provide
complete compensation for the successful party for
the costs incurred by him in the litigation. It would
obviously be unreasonable however on the facts of
the present case to expect the plaintiff which,
though successful in its proceedings, has already
had its claim substantially reduced by the judg
ment to the amount of $135,000, to have to pay
$50,000 for experts' and $25,000 for legal fees to
obtain this award, leaving a very small balance
indeed. It is for that reason that I direct that the
very low and unrealistic sums provided in the tariff
be increased so as to provide part, but not full,
compensation to plaintiff for the disbursements for
experts' and for counsel's fees in these proceedings.
Moreover it might be added that this is the
manner in which the claims of all other parties
expropriated in the Mirabel Airport expropriations
were dealt with, before the judgment in the Smer-
chanski case, and while there is no principle of law
that error, (if indeed these taxations were errone
ously made) made in previous cases must be per
petuated, and that a different procedure cannot be
adopted in later cases as a result of a judgment of
a higher tribunal, it would appear discriminatory
to plaintiff, if as a result of a different reasoning in
its case it should be allowed costs only pursuant to
the very small amounts set out in the Tariff.
ORDER
The time for bringing this application is, extend
ed to today and it is directed, pursuant to Rule
344(7) and paragraph 2(2) of Tariff B that plain
tiffs disbursements in respect of its expert witness
be taxed and allowed under paragraph 4(2) of
Tariff A at a reasonable amount for the services
performed by the witness in preparing to give
evidence and giving evidence at the trial, due
regard being had to the amount of the award made
in the action, to the question of the reasonableness
in the circumstances of the extent of the time spent
by the experts preparing to give evidence and to
the reasonableness of the rate to be paid for such
time, as well as for the time required to attend the
trial and give evidence, and furthermore that pur
suant to Rule 344(7) and paragraph 2(3) of Tariff
B fees of plaintiffs counsel be taxed at an
increased amount due regard being given to the
amount of the award in the action, the question of
the reasonableness of the extent of the time spent
by counsel in connection with the present proceed
ings, the reasonableness of the rate to be paid for
such time, and the minimum amount which he
would have been entitled to have claimed as
extrajudicial fees if the tariff for expropriation
proceedings applicable in the Province of Quebec
were applicable, but also bearing in mind that the
amount so awarded is not intended to provide
complete compensation to the successful party for
all costs incurred in the litigation but only a
reasonable portion of same. Costs of this motion
may be taxed as part of the costs.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.