A-579-78
Gurmukh Singh Gill (Appellant)
v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration
(Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Heald and Le Dain JJ.—
Vancouver, June 12, 1979.
Immigration — Immigration Appeal Board held appellant
not entitled to sponsor the admission to Canada of his natural
father because the evidence did not show the father to be his
legitimate father — Board's decision based on assumption that
appellant had to be his father's "son" within the meaning of s.
2(d) of the Immigration Regulations in order to be able to
sponsor his father's admission — Whether or not the word
'father" in s. 31(1)(d) of the Regulations includes natural
father — Immigration Regulations, Part I, SOR/62-36 as
amended, ss. 2(d), 31(1)(d).
APPEAL.
COUNSEL:
Myra R. Elson for appellant.
Alan D. Louie for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Beck, Robinson & Company, Vancouver, for
appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment of
the Court delivered orally in English by
PRATTE J.: This is an appeal from a decision of
the Immigration Appeal Board which held, in
effect, that the appellant was not entitled to spon
sor the admission to Canada of his natural father,
Bachan Gill, because the evidence did not show
that Bachan Gill was the appellant's legitimate
father.
The Board based its decision on the assumption
that the appellant, in order to be authorized to
sponsor his father's admission, had to be his
father's "son" within the meaning of section 2(d)
of the Immigration Regulations, Part I, SOR/62-
36. This was, in our view, an erroneous assump
tion. Under section 31 of the Regulations, the
appellant was entitled to sponsor his father's
admission on the sole condition that he, the appel
lant, be a "person residing in Canada who [was] a
Canadian citizen or a person lawfully admitted to
Canada for permanent residence". The Regula
tions do not contain any definition of the word
"father" which must, therefore, be given its
normal meaning which includes both natural and
legitimate father. If the author of the Regulations
had wanted to limit the right of sponsors to the
sponsorship of their legitimate parents, he would
not have used the words "father and mother" in
section 31(1) (d) but, rather, the phrase "lawful
father and mother" as he has done in section 2(cf)
where the word "orphan" is defined as meaning "a
person whose lawful father and mother are both
deceased".
It is therefore our view that the word "father" in
section 31(1)(d) of the Regulations includes a
natural father. For that reason, the appeal will be
allowed, the decision of the Board will be set aside
and the matter will be referred back for decision
on the basis that, under section 31(1) (d) of the
Immigration Regulations, Part I, the appellant
was entitled to sponsor the admission of his natural
father.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.