T-2655-75
Pan American World Airways Inc. (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen and the Minister of Transport
(Defendants)
Trial Division, Mahoney J.—Ottawa, November 9
and 10, 1978 and January 3 and 10, 1979.
Aeronautics — International civil aviation — Chicago Con
vention — Fees, prescribed by Regulation, charged American
aircraft not landing in Canada, for telecommunication and en
route navigation services — Plaintiff seeking return of fees
paid under protest and defendant the Queen counterclaiming
for amounts billed but unpaid — Whether or not fees contrary
to National Transportation Policy, the Chicago Convention,
and the 'fundamental principle of equity" — Whether or not
Regulations ultra vires authority delegated by Parliament
Whether or not Parliament authorized imposition of fees, even
if fees validly prescribed — Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
A-3, ss. 4, 5 — National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
N-17, s. 3(b) — Chicago Convention, 15 UNTS 295, Arts. 15,
69, 70.
The plaintiff asserts the illegality of fees charged it by the
defendants for telecommunication and en route navigation ser
vices provided to and used by flights, operated by the plaintiff,
which did not land in Canada. The charges in issue were levied
pursuant to Regulations made under what is now section 5 of
the Aeronautics Act. Plaintiff seeks return of those fees paid
under protest, while defendant the Queen counterclaims for
amounts billed but unpaid. Plaintiff argues that the fees are
contrary to the National Transportation Policy expressed in the
National Transportation Act; that they are contrary to the
Chicago Convention; that they are contrary to the "fundamen-
tal principle of equity" in that the United States does not
charge Canadian aircraft for similar services; that the Regula
tions are ultra vires the authority Parliament has given the
Governor in Council and/or the Minister of Transport; and
that, even if Parliament authorized the Minister to prescribe
the fees in issue, it has not authorized him to impose them or to
enforce their collection.
Held, the action is dismissed. Plaintiff adduced no evidence
to support the allegation that the Governor in Council and
subsequently the Minister of Transport have not demonstrated
that the fees established represent a fair proportion of the real
costs of the services provided, pursuant to section 3(b) of the
National Transportation Act. The telecommunications and en
route services fees charged are not contrary to the Chicago
Convention. Neither the Canadian nor the American aircraft is
charged for services provided to it while over Canadian territo
ry and each is charged identically for services provided to it
while over the high seas. Article 15 of the Convention says that
Canada shall not charge more for the use of a given facility
than it charges a Canadian aircraft for the use of the same
facility. It does not say that Canada shall not charge an
American aircraft more for the use of a given facility than the
United States charges a Canadian aircraft for the use of a
similar facility. The existence in law of a fundamental principle
of equity and/or reciprocal obligation as between nations has
not been established, by evidence or argument; even if it had
been established, the Court is not satisfied that its breach
would give rise to a cause of action at the suit of a subject. The
Regulations, to the extent that they apply to aircraft over the
high seas, are not ultra vires because of Parliament's authoriza
tion for extraterritorial effect being allegedly unclear. The
nature of the subject matter makes an element of extraterritori-
ality inevitable. When a Regulation prescribing a charge under
section 5 of the Aeronautics Act for the use of a facility or
service is made, the charges for that use are not only fixed, but
a legal obligation to pay the charges is also imposed on their
user. That obligation, arising under a law of Canada, is subject
to enforcement by Her Majesty by action in this Court.
ACTION.
COUNSEL:
M. E. Corlett, Q.C. and G. B. Greenwood for
plaintiff.
J. A. Scollin, Q.C. and D. T. Sgayias for
defendants.
SOLICITORS:
Maclaren, Corlett & Tanner, Ottawa, for
plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendants.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
MAHONEY J.: The plaintiff asserts the illegality
of fees charged it by the defendants for telecom
munication and en route navigation services pro
vided to and used by flights, operated by the
plaintiff, which did not land in Canada. The flights
were on two routes: the Polar Route between
points on the west coast of the United States of
America and Europe and the North Atlantic
Route between points in the eastern U.S. and
Europe. The aggregate of the fees in issue amounts
to $6,201,047.50. The entire amount has been
billed; what has been paid was paid under protest.
By agreement, the evidence in this action, with
the exceptions noted, is to apply in two other
actions against the same defendants: one by Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,' and the other by Seaboard
World Airlines Inc. 2 The exceptions are, firstly,
that the latter plaintiff, Seaboard, a cargo carrier,
did not operate flights on the Polar Route and,
secondly, that the aggregate of the fees in issue in
those actions amount, respectively, to $6,094,-
120.50 and $1,194,556.
The bulk of the material evidence was admitted
by way of statements of agreed facts. The
Schedules 3 and 4 to the statement of agreed facts
filed in each action are transposed; references in
the . statements to Schedule 3 should be to
Schedule 4 and vice versa.
Amounts billed and unpaid are the subject of a
counterclaim by the defendant, Her Majesty the
Queen, in each action. The amounts thus claimed
were generally those billed and unpaid up to the
end of 1975: $567,195 in this action; $140,289 in
the Seaboard action and $720,996.50 in the TWA
action. Her Majesty, with consent, was granted
leave to amend each counterclaim by increasing
the amount claimed to that disclosed in the state
ment of agreed facts as billed and unpaid up to
March 31, 1977: $1,716,566.50 in this action;
$357,364 in the Seaboard action and $1,960,752 in
the TWA action.
International civil aviation is governed by a
treaty, the Chicago Convention, signed December
7, 1944 [15 UNTS 295]. Canada and the United
States of America are both bound by that treaty.
The plaintiff is a domestic corporation of one of
the United States of America and its aircraft are
registered in that country.
' Court No. T-2657-75.
2 Court No. T-2656-75.
The amounts in dispute are charges for services
provided by Canada and used by the plaintiffs
aircraft in flights between the United States of
America and Europe. In the course of those
flights, the plaintiffs aircraft did one or both of
two things: they passed over Canadian territory
and/or over international waters within the
Gander Oceanic Control Area, which lies beyond
Canadian territorial waters and generally to the
west of 30° west longitude and to the north of 45°
north latitude. They did not, however, land in
Canada.
The Chicago Convention recognizes Canada's
sovereignty over the airspace above its land and
adjacent territorial waters. Canada provides tele
communication and en route navigational services
to aircraft using its airspace and those aircraft are
required to use those services. In fulfilment of
obligations undertaken pursuant to the Chicago
Convention, Canada provides the same services to
aircraft in the airspace over international waters in
the Gander Oceanic Control Area and the United
States of America requires that its registered air
craft in the Gander Oceanic Control Area airspace
use those services. The services provided were
those from time to time recommended by the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
The charges in issue were levied pursuant to
Regulations made under what is now section 5 of
the Aeronautics Act. 3 It will be necessary to deal
with the pertinent provisions of the Act in some
detail in considering the plaintiffs argument that
the Regulations are ultra vires the authority Par
liament has given the Governor in Council and/or
the Minister of Transport. I will return to that.
The other bases upon which the illegality of the
charges is contended are:
1. That the fees in issue are contrary to the
National Transportation Policy set forth in the
National Transportation Act; 4
3 R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3.
4 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
2. That the imposition of the charges is contrary
to the terms of the Chicago Convention; and
3. That the imposition of the charges contra
venes "the fundamental principle of equity" and
a reciprocal obligation to the United States of
America.
The National Transportation Policy is set forth
in section 3 of the National Transportation Act.
Section 2.1 provides that the Act is binding on Her
Majesty in right of Canada and section 4 provides
that it applies, inter alia, to transport by air to
which the Aeronautics Act applies. The only provi
sion of the Policy which the charges in issue are
said to contravene is paragraph (b):
3. It is hereby declared that an economic, efficient and
adequate transportation system making the best use of all
available modes of transportation at the lowest total cost is
essential to protect the interests of the users of transportation
and to maintain the economic well-being and growth of
Canada, and that these objectives are most likely to be achieved
when all modes of transport are able to compete under condi
tions ensuring that having due regard to national policy and to
legal and constitutional requirements
(b) each mode of transport, so far as practicable, bears a fair
proportion of the real costs of the resources, facilities and
services provided that mode of transport at public expense;
It is alleged that "the Governor in Council be
tween July 1, 1968 and September 9, 1970, and
subsequently the Minister of Transport have not
demonstrated that the Telecommunication Service
Fee and the establishment of an En Route Facili
ties and Services Fee represents a fair proportion
of the real costs of the services provided which can
be charged against the plaintiffs aircraft when in
transit over Canada and its territorial sea".
The plaintiff adduced no evidence whatever in
support of that allegation. The defendants adduced
evidence establishing that while the telecommuni
cations service fee has resulted in a recovery, over
the years in issue, of almost the cost of the service,
pro rata attributable to civilian flights, the en
route services fees, both North Atlantic and Polar,
have fallen far short of covering the same pro rata
share of the costs. On the evidence, I conclude that
the telecommunications service fee has been fixed
with a view to civilian flights bearing a fair propor-
tion of the cost of service. As to the en route
facilities fees, if there is a legitimate complaint to
be made, it lies with the Canadian taxpayers and
not with users of the services. In the circum
stances, I do not find it necessary to consider what
the consequences would be had the plaintiff proved
its factual premise. I should not, however, wish
silence to be taken as necessarily implying agree
ment with any of the assumptions that the plaintiff
must have made in order to raise the matter as a
cause of action at all.
There are two bases upon which the plaintiff
asserts that the Regulations are contrary to the
terms of the Chicago Convention: firstly, because
they impose compulsory charges on the plaintiff's
aircraft while over the high seas and, secondly,
because they impose charges on those aircraft,
both while over Canada and the high seas, greater
than those imposed on Canadian aircraft "engaged
in similar scheduled international air services to
those of the plaintiff'. The only provisions of the
Chicago Convention that mention payment to a
State providing services are Articles 15 and 70.
The latter must be read with Article 69.
Article 15
Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public
use by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provi
sions of Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the
aircraft of all the other contracting States. The like uniform
conditions shall apply to the use, by aircraft of every contract
ing State, of all air navigation facilities, including radio and
meteorological services, which may be provided for public use
for the safety and expedition of air navigation.
Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be imposed
by a contracting State for the use of such airports and air
navigation facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting
State shall not be higher,
(a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international
air services, than those that would be paid by its national
aircraft of the same class engaged in similar operations, and
(b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air
services, than those that would be paid by its national
aircraft engaged in similar international air services.
All such charges shall be published and communicated to the
International Civil Aviation Organization: provided that, upon
representation by an interested contracting State, the charges
imposed for the use of airports and other facilities shall be
subject to review by the Council, which shall report and make
recommendations thereon for the consideration of the State or
States concerned. No fees, dues or other charges shall be
imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right
of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any
aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon.
Article 69
Iff the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air
navigation facilities, including radio and meteorological ser
vices, of a contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the
safe, regular, efficient, and economical operation of interna
tional air services, present or contemplated, the Council shall
consult with the State directly concerned, and other States
affected, with a view to finding means by which the situation
may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that
purpose. No contracting State shall be guilty off an infraction of
this Convention if it fails to carry out these recommendations.
Article 70
A contracting State, in the circumstances arising under the
provisions of Article 69, may conclude an arrangement with the
Council for giving effect to such recommendations. The State
may elect to bear all of the costs involved in any such arrange
ment. If the State does not so elect, the Council may agree, at
the request of the State, to provide for all or a portion of the
costs.
As to Article 70, there is, again, no evidence
whatever that Canada's provision of the services in
issue arose on the initiative of the Council as
contemplated by Article 69. That is a prerequisite
to bringing Article 70 into play. Since Article 70 is
not in play, it cannot be found that Canada, not
having asked the Council to provide some or all of
the costs of the services in issue, must be taken to
have elected to bear them all.
As to Article 15, on a plain reading, it clearly
contemplates charges for the sort of services sub
ject of the fees in issue. Further, nothing in the
Article precludes Canada from levying those
charges in respect of services supplied to flights in
transit over Canada or elsewhere. I find confirma-
tion of my understanding of Article 15 among the
Statements by the Council to Contracting States, 5
adopted December 13, 1973.
30. The providers of route air navigation facilities and services
for international use may require the users to pay their share of
the cost of providing them regardless of where the utilization
takes place. In the particular case where the aircraft does not
fly over the provider State there are however difficult and
complex problems associated with the collection of route facili
ty charges, and it is for the States to find the appropriate kind
of machinery on a bilateral or regional basis for meetings
between provider States and those of the user airlines, aiming
to reach as much agreement as possible concerning the costs of
the facilities and services provided, the charges to be levied and
the methods of collection of these charges.
I recognize that the Statements are not treaty
provisions binding on the contracting States; they
are, however, recommendations and conclusions of
the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization which was constituted by the Chi-
cago Convention and are expressed to be intended
"for the guidance of Contracting States in the
matters dealt with".
The plaintiff says that the charges are higher
than those paid by Canadian registered aircraft
"engaged in similar international air services" or,
if non-scheduled, "engaged in similar operations"
in breach of the limitations imposed by the second
paragraph of Article 15. I do not think, for pur
poses of this action, any distinction is to be made
between the two phrases.
The plaintiff's position is - that, for example, a
Canadian aircraft on a scheduled flight from a
point in eastern Canada to a point in the Carib-
bean is "engaged in similar international air ser
vices" to an American aircraft on a scheduled
flight on the North Atlantic Route. After leaving
Canadian domestic airspace, the Canadian aircraft
crosses American territory and then the high seas
over the New York Oceanic Control Area. After
leaving American domestic airspace, the American
aircraft crosses Canadian territory and then the
high seas over the Gander Oceanic Control Area.
Neither country charges the other's aircraft for
5 ICAO Document 9082-C/1015.
telecommunication or en route services supplied it
while over the other's territory. Canada charges
the American flight while over the high seas but
the United States Government does not charge the
Canadian flight while over the high seas. 6 The
defendants say that that example is not apt. They
say that, for example, a Canadian aircraft on a
flight from Montreal to Europe via the North
Atlantic Route is "engaged in similar international
air services" to the American aircraft. Neither the
Canadian nor the American aircraft is charged for
services provided to it while over Canadian territo
ry and each is charged identically for services
provided to it while over the high seas.
Neither country, it appears, charges the other's
aircraft for telecommunication or en route ser
vices, per se, provided to transborder flights, e.g.
Seattle-Vancouver, nor to flights between two
points in one that cross the territory of the other,
e.g. Chicago-Anchorage or Toronto-Halifax. The
purpose of the Chicago Convention was to effect a
multilateral arrangement for international civil
aviation. I do not think that bilateral transborder
and overflight arrangements between Canada and
the United States are of assistance to an under
standing of the Convention.
The limitation in Article 15 applies to charges
that a contracting State "may impose or permit to
be imposed". It says nothing of the charges that
6 It is necessary to stipulate that it is the United States
Government that does not charge for services provided the
Canadian flight. The evidence is that radio communication
between points in the United States and aircraft over the high
seas in Oceanic Control Areas to which it provides the services
is conducted by a private corporation, jointly owned by a
number of American airlines including the plaintiff, rather
than by an agency of the United States Government. That
corporation does charge for its services on a "per message"
basis, the rate being the same for foreign as American aircraft.
If the communication is one the aircraft is required by law to
make with American aviation authorities, the United States
Government pays; otherwise, the owner of the aircraft pays.
another State may impose or permit. Article 15
says that Canada shall not charge more for the use
of a given facility than it charges a Canadian
aircraft for the use of the same facility. It does not
say that Canada shall not charge an American
aircraft more for the use of a given facility than
the United States charges a Canadian aircraft for
the use of a similar facility. The defendants'
understanding of what are "similar international
air services", in the context of Article 15, is
correct.
The evidence is that Canadian aircraft en route
to Europe via the Polar Route are charged precise
ly the same fee as American aircraft overflying
Canada on the same route. The only distinction
between the Polar and North Atlantic en route
fees, other than rates, is that the former are for
Canadian services and facilities used by aircraft
while over Canadian territory while the latter are
for Canadian services and facilities used by air
craft while over the high seas. As to the telecom
munications service fee, there is no evidence what
ever that it is not levied as provided in the
Regulations. The Regulations take no account of
the nationality of the aircraft using and charged
for any of the services.
It follows that the telecommunications and
Polar and North Atlantic en route services fees
charged are not contrary to the Chicago Conven
tion. Having arrived at that conclusion, I find it
unnecessary to deal with the places, if any, of
Articles 15 and 70 of the Chicago Convention in
Canadian domestic law.
The plaintiff also argues that imposition of the
charges contravenes "the fundamental principle of
equity" and a reciprocal obligation to the United
States of America. That is based on the allegation
that Canada is charging American aircraft for
services in circumstances in which the United
States does not charge Canadian aircraft and on
the notion that the bilateral arrangements as to
transborder and overflying domestic flights ought
to be extended to the international flights under
taken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff relies here on
the same evidence as adduced in support of the
argument that Article 15 of the Chicago Conven
tion was breached. The existence in law of such a
fundamental principle of equity and/or reciprocal
obligation as between nations has not been estab
lished to my satisfaction either by evidence or
argument. Neither am I satisfied that, if such were
established as binding sovereign nations, the
breach thereof would give rise to a cause of action
at the suit of a subject.
In this regard I should mention the expert evi
dence of Norman P. Seagrave, which, on reflec
tion, I feel was wholly inadmissible notwithstand
ing that counsel for the defendants did not press
his objection. The statement of his proposed evi
dence in chief, filed pursuant to Rule 482, begins:
My testimony is directed to the question whether, under Inter
national Law, Canada has the right to levy on the United
States' airlines charges for air navigation and services provided
by Canada over the High Seas.
While expert evidence as to foreign law is, of
course, admissible, expert evidence as to domestic
law is not. It is well established that international
law has no force in Canada unless it has been
adopted as domestic law. 7 Opinion evidence as to
the proper construction to be placed on the Chi-
cago Convention was not admissible and I have
not, therefore, considered Mr. Seagrave's state
ment as evidence but, on the assumption that
plaintiff's counsel would willingly adopt it as argu-
7 Reference re Exemption of Members of U.S. Military
Forces from Proceedings in Canadian Criminal Courts [1943]
S.C.R. 483, per Taschereau J., at 516 ff.
... international law has no application in Canada unless
incorporated in our own domestic law.
If not accepted in this country, international law would not
be binding, but would merely be a code of unenforceable
abstract rules of international morals.
ment, I have considered it such.
The contention that the imposition of the fees is
ultra vires because of the overriding authority of
the Chicago Convention is without merit for the
reasons already given. Their imposition is simply
not contrary to any obligation assumed by Canada
under the treaty and it is unnecessary to consider
the consequences if it were.
The Regulations are also said to be ultra vires
to the extent that they bear on the plaintiff's
aircraft over the high seas. That is because their
extraterritorial operation is said not to have been
clearly authorized by Parliament.
The facilities in issue physically exist in Canada.
The services in issue are rendered by persons,
physically present in Canada, using those facilities.
The information generated by those persons using
those facilities and performing those services is
transmitted by radio. By the nature of that mode
of transmission, the information can and is intend
ed to be received anywhere, and put to use where
received. To the extent that there is an element of
extraterritoriality in the operation of the Air Ser
vices Fees Regulations, the nature of the subject
matter makes it inevitable.
The Regulations are made pursuant to section 5
of the Aeronautics Act, not section 4. 8 The author
ity to make regulations under section 4 is limited,
inter alia, to apply "in respect of flights within
Canada". No such limitation appears in section 5.
8 4. The Governor in Council may make regulations imposing
upon the owners or operators of aircraft, wherever resident, in
respect of flights within Canada, charges for the availability
during such flights of any facility or service provided by or on
behalf of the Minister, and every charge so imposed constitutes
a legal obligation enforceable by Her Majesty by action in the
Federal Court of Canada.
5. The Governor in Council may make regulations, or, sub
ject to . and in accordance with such terms and conditions as
may be specified by him, authorize the Minister to make
regulations prescribing charges for the use of
(a) any facility or service provided by the Minister or on his
behalf for or in respect of any aircraft; and
(b) any facility or service not coming within paragraph (a)
provided by the Minister or on his behalf at any airport.
The competence of Parliament to legislate with
extraterritorial effect is not open to question. Its
general intention to legislate with that effect, in
enacting the Aeronautics Act, is to be inferred
from its subject matter and, in so far as section 5
itself is concerned, the intention to delegate the
authority seems apparent when that section is
compared with section 4.
Finally, the plaintiff says that while Parliament
has authorized the Minister to prescribe the fees in
issue, it has not authorized him to impose them or
enforce their collection. This contention is based
on a rather odd discrepancy between sections 4
and 5.
Section 4 authorizes the making of regulations
imposing charges while section 5 authorizes the
making of regulations prescribing charges. Section
4 expressly provides both a liability for the
imposed charges and a procedure for their collec
tion while section 5 is silent on those matters. The
plaintiff says that, in the circumstances, "prescrib-
ing" cannot mean "imposing" and that, in effect,
the authority under section 5 is limited to fixing
the charges and does not extend to the creation of
a liability to pay them or an authority to collect
them.
This argument has given me considerable dif
ficulty. It occurred to me that if liability to pay the
fees did not arise under the legislation it might
arise elsewhere and there might be some question
as to the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the coun
terclaim. The question of jurisdiction was not
raised by the plaintiff in its pleadings nor in the
initial argument. I reopened the hearing for fur
ther argument on the point. The defendants
expressly reject the proposition that the liability
arises in contract or quasi-contract and, with that,
deny the existence of any question as to jurisdic
tion. The plaintiff apparently remains content with
its initial position that there is a fatal gap in the
legislative scheme whereby Parliament has over
looked imposing a liability to pay the prescribed
charges. Under the circumstances, I do not intend
to deal further with the matter and shall proceed
on the basis that the statute is to be interpreted
with a view only to the alternative results pro
pounded by counsel.
"Prescribing" as used in section 5 is the gerund
of the word "prescribe", a transitive verb. It is not
used in a medical context nor can it be found that
Parliament intended to use it in one of its obsolete
meanings. As a word having a technical legal
meaning "prescribing" may be a word relating to
the loss of a right by effluxion of time but it is
plainly not employed in that sense in section 5. It
is to be given its ordinary English meaning.
The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) defines
the current, transitive, verb "prescribe" as follows:
To write or lay down as a rule or direction to be followed; to
appoint, ordain, direct, enjoin.
Funk and Wagnall's New `Standard" Dictionary
of the English Language (1961) has the following
definition:
To set or lay down authoritatively for direction or control; give
as a law or direction.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1961) defines it in the following terms:
to lay down authoritatively as a guide, direction or rule of
action: impose as a peremptory order; DICTATE, DIRECT,
ORDAIN.
Referring to the same dictionaries, the Oxford's
pertinent definition of "impose" is:
To lay on, as something to be borne, endured, or submitted to;
to inflect (something) on or upon; to levy or enforce authorita
tively or arbitrarily.
Funk & Wagnall's definition is:
To lay or place, as something to be borne or endured; levy or
exact as by authority; as to impose a tax, toll, or penalty.
Webster's definition is:
to make, frame or apply (as a charge, tax, obligation, rule,
penalty) as compulsory, obligatory or enforceable; LEVY,
INFLICT.
The words are synonyms. They have the same
general meaning. Parliament may have intended to
make a significant distinction between the authori
ties delegated by using "imposing" in section 4 and
"prescribing" in section 5; however, that is not the
most reasonable construction to be put on the
sections. The corollary of the plaintiff's argument
would, it seems, be that when the. Governor in
Council "imposes" a charge under section 4, he
does everything necessary but fix the amount of
the charge and that there is no authority for him
to do that, thereby rendering the legislative
scheme fatally deficient. It is not, I think, to be
assumed that Parliament, speaking in ordinary
English, intends synonyms necessarily to have very
different meanings, thereby rendering a legislative
scheme as incomplete as the plaintiff would have
this one. It is not an argument that would have
occurred to any but a lawyer nor, very likely, even
to a lawyer had the sections not appeared in
immediate proximity.
I therefore conclude that when the Governor in
Council or Minister of Transport, with due author
ity, which is not questioned in this action, makes a
regulation prescribing a charge under section 5 of
the Aeronautics Act for the use of any facility or
service, he not only fixes the charges for such use
but imposes on their user a legal obligation to pay
the charges. That obligation, arising as it does
under a law of Canada, is subject to enforcement
by Her Majesty by action in this Court. The action
will be dismissed and the counterclaim allowed, all
with costs.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.