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T-52-88
Harvinder Singh Sethi (Applicant) v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration and Attorney General of Canada (Respondents) *
INDEXED AS: SETHI v. CANADA (MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION)
Trial Division, Reed J.—Winnipeg, March 1; Ottawa, March 8, 1988.
Judicial review — Prerogative writs — Prohibition — Pending legislation would remove from office Immigration Appeal Board members, some of whom being named to new Board — Government opposing applicant's refugee status claim — Whether situation creating reasonable apprehension
of bias No allegation of actual bias — Argument courts ignore status of bills not to point as existence of bill very fact giving rise to apprehension of bias — Whether event at base of apprehension too remote to support apprehension — Bill at sufficiently advanced stage of legislative process that not too remote Underpinning of independence of decision maker — Objective independence and perception thereof both necessary — Independence and impartiality different, if overlapping, concepts — Test ,to determine if reasonable apprehension of bias existing — Test depending on nature of tribunal or
interest adjudicated High standard required in refugee status determinations — Security of person at stake — Present Board members having reason to think financial pros pects in hands of government — Prohibition granted.
Immigration — Immigration Appeal Board — Motion to prohibit Board from determining application for refugee status as long as government proposing to remove Board members from office pursuant to Bill C-55 — Bill C-55 providing for removal of existing Board members and appointment of some
to new Board Reasonable suspicion of bias test — Board members' financial security threatened — Fact government to select new members from existing Board members and oppos-
*Editor's Note: This decision was reversed on appeal by Mahoney J. (concurred in by Heald and Urie JJ.), A-493-88, June 20, 1988. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the Trial Judge erred in considering relevant the stage to which Bill C-55 had advanced in the parliamentary process. It held that no informed, right-minded person viewing the situation from outside, would think it more likely than not that the Board will not deal fairly with applicants because of the government's intentions as expressed in Bill C-55. The Court of Appeal decision will be reported on'a top priority basis.
ing refugee status claim justifying apprehension members might favour government's position.
The applicant seeks an order to prohibit the Immigration Appeal Board from determining his application for Convention refugee status for as long as the government proposes to remove the Board's members from office as contemplated by Bill C-55. Bill C-55, passed by the House of Commons on October 21, 1987, establishes a new Board for the determination of immi gration matters and provides that some, but not all, of the existing Board members will become full members of the new Board. The applicant argues that this situation creates a reasonable apprehension of bias, an apprehension that the existing Board members will tend to lean in favour of the government, which is opposing his claim for refugee status. It is submitted that the principles of natural justice, and the require ments of paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights and those of section 7 of the Charter all require that a person's rights be adjudicated upon by an independent decision maker.
Held, the application should be allowed.
The respondent's submission that there can be no reasonable apprehension of bias since Bill C-55 is not yet statute law is without merit. Bill C-55 is at a sufficiently advanced stage in the legislative process that the event which constitutes the basis of the apprehension cannot be said to be too remote to support a finding of apprehension of bias if that finding is valid for other reasons.
As noted by Mr. Justice Le Dain in Valente v. The Queen et al., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, while the concept of independence overlaps with the requirement that there be a lack of apprehen sion of bias, the two are different concepts. The question therefore focusses on the test to be used in determining whether reasonable apprehension of bias exists: is it necessary to show that a "real likelihood of bias" exists or is it sufficient to establish that a "reasonable suspicion of bias" exists? The test will vary with the nature of the tribunal or interest being adjudicated. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Singh has made it clear that in cases involving the determination of refugee status, a very high standard of fairness is required. Here, the interest being determined by the Immigration Appeal Board relates to the security of the person. Since a very high standard must be met in the present situation, it is necessary to apply the reasonable suspicion of bias test set out by Rand J. in Szilard v. Szasz, [1955] S.C.R. 3 and reiterated by Laskin C.J.C. in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369. As stated by Laskin C.J.C. in the National Energy Board case, that test is "ground- ed in a firm concern that there be no lack of public confidence in impartiality of adjudicative agencies".
The question whether the facts are such that a reasonably well-informed person would have a reasonable apprehension that the members of the Board might be likely to favour the government's position over that of the applicant, should be answered in the affirmative. In the present case, the Board members have been appointed for varying terms. They would
have undertaken the appointment on that basis and arranged their financial affairs accordingly. Bill C-55 threatens that financial security by proposing that all the members be removed from office while holding out the possibility that some will be reappointed full time. Given the fact that the govern ment will select the latter from the existing members and the fact that it is the government which is opposing the claim before the Board, there exists a reasonable apprehension of bias.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Bill C-55, An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, 2d Sess., 33rd Parl., 1986-87, ss. 18, 38(1),(2),(3),(4),(7).
Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix 111, s. 2(e).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.), ss. 7, 8, 11(d).
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 59(2) (as am. by S.C. 1986, c. 13, s. I), 60.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] I S.C.R. 369; Szilard v. Szasz, [1955] S.C.R. 3.
CONSIDERED:
Iscar Ltd. v. Karl Hertel GmbH, T-2332-85, Jerome A.C.J., order dated 29/1/88, F.C.T.D., not yet reported; Valente v. The Queen et al., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673.
REFERRED TO:
Singh et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigra tion, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
AUTHORS CITED
Shetreet, S. and Deschênes, J., eds. Judicial Indepen dence: The Contémporary Debate. Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985.
De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action. 4th ed. by J. M. Evans. London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1980.
COUNSEL:
David Matas for applicant.
Brian H. Hay for respondent Minister of
Employment and Immigration.
SOLICITORS:
David Matas, Winnipeg, for applicant. Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent Minister of Employment and Immigration.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
REED J.: The applicant seeks an order to prohib it the Immigration Appeal Board from adjudicat ing his claim of Convention refugee status. He asks that such an order issue for as long as the government proposes to remove the Board's mem bers from office along the lines contained in, and on the coming into force of, Bill C-55, An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, 2d Sess., 33d Parl., 1986-87 (passed by House of Commons, October 21, 1987).
Counsel for the applicant's argument can be succinctly summarized as follows. The members of the Immigration Appeal Board were originally appointed for a fixed term, to hold office during good behaviour.' Upon the coming into force of Bill C-55, the present Immigration Appeal Board will cease to function. Bill C-55 creates a new Board for the determination of immigration mat ters, to be called the Immigration and Refugee Board (see section 18 of Bill C-55). The members of the present Board will not automatically become members of the new Board. Subsection 38(1) of Bill C-55 provides:
' Subsection 59(2) and section 60 of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52 provided as follows:
59....
(2) The Board shall consist of not less than seven and not more than eighteen members to be appointed by the Gover nor in Council.
60. (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (5), each member shall be appointed to hold office during good behaviour for a term not exceeding ten years, but may be removed by the Governor in Council for cause.
(2) Each member is eligible for re-appointment.
(Continued on next page)
38. (1) Subject to this section, the members of the former Board and the members of the former Committee cease to hold office on the commencement day.
There is provision for some continuing jurisdiction with respect to pending applications. Subsections 38(2) and (3) provide:
38....
(2) The members of the former Board continue to have jurisdiction to hear and determine pending applications for redetermination of claims and pending appeals as described in section 48. [It is not necessary to refer to the text of section 48.]
(3) The Chairman has supervision over and direction of the work of the members of the former Board having continuing jurisdiction under subsection (2).
It is contemplated, however, that some but not all of the existing Board members will become full members of the new Board. Subsection 38(4) provides:
38....
(4) Each member of the former Board having continuing jurisdiction under subsection (2), other than a person appointed to the Refugee Division or the Appeal Division, shall be paid the fees for services rendered under the said Act fixed by the Governor in Council for part-time members of the Refugee Division. [Underlining added.]
(Continued from previous page)
(3) A member ceases to hold office on attaining the age of seventy years.
(4) No person who has attained the age of sixty-five years shall be appointed a member.
(5) Each member who, immediately prior to the coming into force of this Act, was a permanent member of the Immigration Appeal Board established by section 3 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, as it read before it was repealed by subsection 1280) of this Act, continues in office as a member of the Board and shall hold such office during good behavior but may be removed by the Governor in Council for cause.
These provisions were amended somewhat in 1986 (S.C. 1986, c. 13) in response to the Supreme Court decision in Singh et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177:
1. Subsection 59(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976 is repealed and the following substituted therefor:
"(2) The Board shall consist of not fewer than seven and not more than fifty members to be appointed by the Governor in Council.
(3) Notwithstanding subsections 60(1) and (2) but sub ject to subsection (4), not more than eighteen members may be appointed for terms exceeding two years and a member appointed for a term not exceeding two years is only eligible for re-appointment for one term not exceeding two years.
(4) A member appointed for a term not exceeding two years is eligible for re-appointment for one or more terms exceeding two years if fewer than eighteen members are serving terms exceeding two years."
And subsection 38(7) provides:
38....
(7) No person appointed to hold office as a member of the former Board or of the former Committee has any right to claim or receive any compensation, damages, indemnity or other form of relief from Her Majesty in right of Canada or any servant or agent thereof for ceasing to hold office under this section or for the abolition of that office by this Act, but the Governor in Council may, by order, authorize or provide for any such relief.
Counsel for the applicant argues that it is the government which is opposing his client's claim for refugee status while, at the same time, that gov ernment is about to "fire" all the existing Board members and select some of them, but not all, to become members of the new Board. This, it is argued, creates a reasonable apprehension of bias, an apprehension that the existing Board members will tend to lean in favour of the government's position.
I note, first of all, that no allegation is made that actual bias exists. The argument is put solely on the basis that there is a reasonable apprehen sion of bias. It is trite law that the existence, or non-existence of actual bias is irrelevant to this issue.
Secondly, no claim is made that the applicant should "escape" having his status determined. But, it is argued that this should occur either after Bill C-55 is enacted, by the new Board, or if the government should announce that it does not intend to remove the present Board members from office as contemplated in Bill C-55, then, by the existing Board.
Thirdly, a decision in the applicant's favour will have no effect on other decisions which, since the introduction of Bill C-55, have been made by the Immigration Appeal Board. The applicants cov ered by those decisions did not object to the Board's jurisdiction; accordingly, they would be taken to have waived any objection to the Board's jurisdiction on the ground being asserted by this applicant.
Counsel for the respondent argues that there can be no reasonable apprehension of bias because Bill
C-55 is merely a bill and not yet statute law. He argues that the courts traditionally do not pay attention to bills because a great deal of uncertain ty exists with respect to whether they will in fact become law. Also, he argues, it is impossible to determine at what point apprehension should be said to arise: on passage of the Bill through the House of Commons; on introduction to the House; when the legislation is being drafted; when policy is being discussed before drafting is started.
In the context of this case, I do not find either of these arguments convincing. While courts tradi tionally do not pay much attention to bills which are before legislatures, this usually occurs in response to arguments made concerning issues of interpretation with respect to the existing legisla tion. A similar attitude is exhibited when a court is asked to determine an issue on the assumption that a given bill will become law. I cannot forbear from quoting some recent comments by the Associate Chief Justice in this regard:
Second, the principal ground advanced in support of the stay is that a Bill is presently before the Parliament of Canada which will not only take away the plaintiffs' cause of action, but as I understand it, will do so retroactively. 1 am asked to find this rather special situation to be more appropriate for a stay of proceedings than parallel proceedings. I take the oppo site view. I cannot imagine anything less predictable than the course of legislation through Parliament. Indeed, the only thing that is certain about life in Parliament is that nothing is certain. The ever-present possibility of a crisis leading to an election or a general election without such a crisis, to say nothing of a hostile Senate, underline only the most basic realities that make it impossible to predict whether any meas ure will become law, let alone when.
These comments are found in Iscar Ltd. v. Karl Hertel GmbH, F.C.T.D., January 29, 1988, Jerome A.C.J., not yet reported (T-2332-85). But, in this case, the apprehension of bias argument is based on the fact that Bill C-55 is not yet law. If it were law, the creation of the new Board would be a fait accompli; there would no longer be an argument that reasonable apprehension of bias existed (or if there were, it would be based on other grounds). I do not think the argument that courts in general ignore the status of bills before legislatures pertains in this case. The existence of
Bill C-55 is the very fact which gives rise to the argument that an apprehension of bias exists.
As noted, counsel for the respondent argues that if one is to give some weight to the existence of Bill C-55, it becomes an impossible task of knowing where in the legislative process to draw the line (at the policy development stage of legislation, at the drafting stage, etc.). I do not think it is necessary to address the issue in those terms. The question is whether the event which is said to lie at the base of the apprehension of bias, in this case, is too remote to support such apprehension. In my view, given our system of government, once a piece of legisla tion has passed the House of Commons, there is a reasonable likelihood that it will become law. That is not, of course, to say that there is certainty. There may be amendments proposed, by the Senate, which lead to change. The Bill may die on the order paper. The Bill may be passed by the House of Commons and the Senate and signed by the Governor General, but never proclaimed in force. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this case, I think the Bill is at a sufficiently advanced stage in the legislative process so that it would not be too remote or speculative an event to support a finding of apprehension of bias if that finding is valid for other reasons.
I turn then to the heart of the argument being made by counsel for the applicant. It is argued that the basic principles of natural justice (at common law) and the requirements of paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III] 2 and those of fundamental justice prescribed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
2 2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accord ance with the principles of fundamental justice for the deter mination of his rights and obligations;
Rights and Freedoms [being Part I of the Consti tution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)], 3 all require that a person's rights be adjudicated upon by an independent decision maker. As noted, this carries with it the requirement that there be no facts from which a conclusion can be drawn that a reasonable appre hension of bias exists. He notes that two of the cardinal underpinnings of the existence of the in dependence of a decision maker are: (1) security of tenure; (2) financial security. Mr. Matas, counsel for the applicant, made reference to the declara tions of three international bodies as relevant to this case.
The International Bar Association, in October 22, 1982, at a Conference in Delhi, unanimously approved standards (drafted as a proposal by the Association's Committee on the Administration of Justice) respecting the administration of justice. One of these stated:
20(b) In case of legislation abolishing courts, judges serving in these courts shall not be affected, except for their transfer to another court of the same status.
The Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific (Lawasia) issued a report on the indepen dence of the judiciary, following a seminar in Tokyo on July 17-18, 1982. One of the principles and conclusions formulated in that report states:
11.(d)(iii) The abolition of the court of which a judge is a member should not be accepted as a reason or an occasion for the removal of a judge.
The collection of papers and addresses edited by Shetreet and Deschênes, entitled Judicial In dependence: The Contemporary Debate, at page 454, contains the text of the "Universal Declara tion on the Independence of Justice", adopted at Montréal on June 10, 1983. That Declaration contains the following statement:
2.39 In the event that a court is abolished, judges serving in this court shall not be affected, except for their transfer to another court of the same status.
Counsel for the applicant also referred to the Supreme Court decision in Valente v. The Queen et al., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. In that case, a Provin -
3 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
cial Court Judge had declined jurisdiction with respect to a proceeding before him on the ground that he was not an independent tribunal as required by paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. ° Lack of in dependence was asserted on a number of grounds, among them were: some provincial court judges were appointed at pleasure (i.e., those that had reached retirement age); the executive not the legislative branch of government determined the judges' salaries; the salaries and pensions were not a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund; sal aries were the subject of annual parliamentary appropriation; a judge received fringe benefits similar to civil servants (sick leave, dental plans, life and accident insurance, etc.); a judge could be removed after an inquiry, but without a vote of the legislature. It is not necessary to list all the points which were alleged to undercut the independent status of provincial court judges.
The relevance of the Valente decision, to this case, is that the Supreme Court seemed to hold that in order to satisfy paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there had to be not only a status or relationship of independence, resting on objective institutional conditions or guarantees, e.g. security of tenure, financial security, etc., but also a perception that the tribunal is independent (see particularly, page 689 of the Supreme Court decision). This second branch of the test, as expressed by the Court of Appeal of Ontario, was an adaptation of the test applying in apprehension of bias cases (pages 684- 685 of the Supreme Court decision). The Supreme Court seemed to adopt the view that there must be not only objective independence, but also a precep- tion of independence, while at the same time, making it clear that independence and impartiality are two different, if overlapping, concepts. Mr. Justice Le Dain, at page 685, noted:
Although there is obviously a close relationship between in dependence and impartiality, they are nevertheless separate and distinct values or requirements. Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the
' 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right.
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
parties in a particular case ... The word "independent" in s. 11(d) reflects or embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial independence. As such, it connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, particularly the Executive Branch of government, that rests on objective condi tions or guarantees.
Mr. Justice Le Dain then went on to analyse the arguments made with respect to three distinct aspects of the status of the provincial court judges in issue: security of tenure; financial security; administrative control by the executive branch of government. Mr. Justice Le Dain determined that the requirements of independence prescribed by paragraph 11(d) of the Charter would not be the same for all judges and all tribunals; the highest standard, that applicable in the case of a superior court judge, was not a standard that had to be met in all cases (refer to pages 693-694 of the deci sion). With the exception of the appointment at pleasure of post-retirement judges, the Supreme Court found that the conditions which pertained with respect to the institutional relationships be tween the provincial court judges and the provin cial executive, in the Valente case, were not such as to constitute an infringement of paragraph 11(d).
I note that the authorities to which counsel for the applicant has referred all relate to the require ment of independence. As noted above, while the concept of independence overlaps with the require ment that there be a lack of apprehension of bias, the two are different concepts. Therefore, it is necessary to ask, first, what is the test used in determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists.
Counsel for the respondent argues that it is the test referred to in the Valente decision, at page 684:
... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal [see [1976] 2 F.C. 20, at p. 29], that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—conclude" ....
Counsel argues that this quotation from Mr. Jus tice de Grandpré's decision in Committee for Jus tice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, is an endorsement by the
Supreme Court of that test as applicable with respect to both the determination of apprehension of bias and with respect to a determination of whether or not a perception of independence exists.
I do not read Mr. Justice Le Dain's reference to the above quotation this way. It seems to me Mr. Justice Le Dain, in the passage quoted, is doing no more than summarizing the reasons which the Ontario Court of Appeal had given in the court below. Also, the test referred to, that expressed by Mr. Justice de Grandpré, was in the context of the National Energy Board case, a dissenting judg ment.
I think it is fair to characterize the National Energy Board case as one which dealt with the question whether the test for a reasonable appre hension of bias was one in which it was necessary to show that "a real likelihood of bias" existed or whether it was sufficient to show that "a reason able suspicion of bias" existed. It seems to me, the Supreme Court adopted the latter. At page 391 of the decision, Chief Justice Laskin, in writing for the majority, stated:
This Court in fixing on the test of reasonable apprehension of bias, as in Ghirardosi v. Minister of Highways for British Columbia, and again in Blanchette v. C.I.S. Ltd., (where Pigeon J. said at p. 842-43, that "a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not act in an entirely impartial manner is ground for disqualification") was merely restating what Rand J. said in Szilard v. Szasz, at pp. 6-7 in speaking of the "probability or reasoned suspicion of biased appraisal and judgment, unintended though it be". This test is grounded in a firm concern that there be no lack of public confidence in the impartiality of adjudicative agencies, and I think that emphasis is lent to this concern in the present case by the fact that the National Energy Board is enjoined to have regard for the public interest.
The two formulations of the test for reasonable apprehension of bias are addressed in de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed., London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1980, at pages 262-264:
A "real likelihood" of bias means at least a substantial possibil ity of bias. The court, it has been said, will judge of the matter "as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business." The test of real likelihood of bias, which has been applied in a number of leading cases in magisterial and liquor licensing law, is based on the reasonable apprehen sions of a reasonable man fully apprised of the facts. It is no doubt desirable that all judges, like Caesar's wife, should be
above suspicion; but it would be hopeless for the courts to insist that only "people who cannot be suspected of improper motives" were qualified at common law to discharge judicial functions, or to quash decisions on the strength of the suspi cions of fools or other capricious and unreasonable people.
What is the position if the court is satisfied, on the evidence before it, that there was no real likelihood of bias but is nevertheless of the opinion that a reasonable man, at the time when the decision under review was made, could well have suspected that the tribunal would be biased? Does the public interest nevertheless demand that the original decision be set aside? The cases do not speak with one voice on this matter. The courts have often quashed decisions on the strength of the reasonable suspicions of the party aggrieved, without having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed.
... the pendulum has now swung towards a test of reasonable suspicion, founded on the apprehensions of a reasonable man who had taken reasonable steps to inform himself of the material facts. "Reasonable suspicion" tests look mainly to outward appearances; "real likelihood" tests focus on the court's own evaluation of the probabilities; but in practice the tests have much in common with one another, and in the vast majority of cases they will lead to the same result. For the courts to retain both tests as alternative methods of approach is unlikely to cause serious uncertainty, and there may be advan tages in preserving a measure of flexibility.
Mr. Justice Rand, in the Szilard [Szilard v. Szasz, [1955] S.C.R. 3] case, at page 4, stated with respect to arbitrators of a commercial dispute:
In particular they must be untrammelled by such influences as to a fair minded person would raise a reasonable doubt of that impersonal attitude which each party is entitled to. This princi ple has found expression in innumerable cases ....
And, at pages 6-7:
It is the probability or the reasoned suspicion of biased apprais al and judgment, unintended though it may be, that defeats the adjudication at its threshold.
It is the case which Chief Justice Laskin cited in the National Energy Board case.
The test for reasonable apprehension of bias, as with perception of independence, will vary with the nature of the tribunal or interest being adjudicat ed. This is clearly so under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and indeed it was so at common law. The Singh case has made it clear, however, that in cases involving the determination of refugee status, a very high
standard, on the scale of values, is required. The interests being determined by the Immigration Appeal Board, in these cases, relate to the security of the person. Keeping in mind, then, that a very high standard of fairness (fundamental justice) (natural justice) must be met in the present situa tion, it is necessary to apply, to the facts of this case, the test set out by Mr. Justice Rand in the Szilard case and reiterated by Chief Justice Laskin in the National Energy Board case.
The result of doing so, in my view, leads to the conclusion that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists. The present Board members have been put in a position where they have every reason to think that their immediate financial future is unsettled and in the hands of the government. That same government is opposing the applicant's claim for refugee status, the question which is before the Board. I emphasize that there is no suggestion of actual bias. Counsel for the applicant stressed that no such allegation was being made and there is not a shred of evidence to suggest actual bias. The question is whether the facts are such that a reasonably well-informed person would have a reasonable apprehension that the members of the Board, in the present circumstances, might be likely to try to please the government, by favouring its position over that of the person opposing the government. I think such exists.
This is not a case where the members were originally appointed on a short term basis (although since 1985 some have been so appointed) 5 . While it is true that the shorter the term of an appointment, when such is renewable, the closer one gets to effective appointment "at pleasure", this case does not deal with that issue. In this case, the Board members were appointed for varying terms (some for 10 years). They would have undertaken the appointment on that basis and arranged or planned their financial affairs accordingly. What Bill C-55 does, is undercut that financial planning, that financial security. By threatening to "throw" all the members of the
5 Supra, ftn. 1.
Board out of office, it threatens the financial security of the members, while at the same time, holding out the possibility that some of them will be reappointed full time. In my view, given the fact that it is the government which will select from the existing Board members, those that will be reappointed full time, and it is the government which is opposing the applicant's claim before the Board, I accept the applicant's contention that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists.
Two procedural matters remain to be comment ed upon. Counsel for the respondent raised the preliminary objection that many of the appendices to the applicant's affidivit are not appropriate: some are authorities; some are matters about which the applicant does not have personal knowl edge; the affidavit is not one framed as based on information and belief. Although counsel for the respondent wished his objection noted for the record, he also indicated that he preferred that the motion proceed on the basis of the material as filed, it being expeditious and convenient to do so. Secondly, counsel for the respondent indicated that while the applicant's style of cause named both the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Employment and Immigration as respondents, he was only appearing on behalf of the latter.
For the reasons given, the applicant will have an order prohibiting the present Immigration Appeal Board from determining his application for Con vention refugee for as long as a reasonable appre hension of bias exists as described herein. The applicant is entitled to recover his costs.
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