T-1240-87
Simma Holt (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Defendant)
INDEXED AS: HOLT v. CANADA
Trial Division, McNair J.—Vancouver, April 18;
Ottawa, August 29, 1988.
Federal Court jurisdiction — Trial Division — Application
to add former Chairman of National Parole Board and ficti
tious persons as defendants — Plaintiff alleging conspiracy to
secure her wrongful dismissal, and violation of Charter, s. 15
equality rights — ITO test applied — Tortious claims against
individuals not derived from existing body of federal law —
Chairman's responsibilities too fragile a link to establish
jurisdiction — Action against Crown for vicarious liability not
foreclosed by want of jurisdiction over individuals — As
liability created by Crown Liability Act, claim founded on
federal law.
This was an application for leave to amend the statement of
claim and to add as defendants the former Chairman of the
National Parole Board and two fictitious defendants in their
personal capacities. The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy among
the proposed defendants to bring about her wrongful dismissal
from the Board, thereby denying her equality rights and dis
criminating against her in violation of the Charter, section 15.
It was also alleged that the Chairman had played a prominent
role in influencing the Cabinet decision not to reappoint the
plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the three requirements set
out in the ITO case were met. It was submitted that a statutory
grant of jurisdiction was found in paragraph 17(4)(b) of the
Federal Court Act; and that the alleged Charter, section 15
violations satisfied both the requirements of an existing body of
federal law essential to the disposition of the case and that such
law was a "law of Canada" as that phrase is used in the
Constitution Act, 1867. The defendant submitted that the
causes of action constituted the torts of conspiracy and deceit,
and were founded on provincial law. Thus the second and third
requirements in ITO could not be met. The issue was whether
the Court had jurisdiction over claims against the proposed
defendants, and over the claim of vicarious liability against the
Crown.
Held, the application should be dismissed as to adding
defendants, but the paragraphs raising the issue of vicarious
liability should stand.
Paragraph 17(4)(b) is insufficient to found jurisdiction to
entertain an action against individual defendants when the
claims against them are based on tort, not federal law. The
tortious claims against the individual defendants do not derive
from an existing body of federal law governing liability in the
context of providing a "detailed statutory framework" suffi
cient to fasten liability on such defendants. That the Chairman
was the chief executive officer charged by the Parole Act with
general supervision over the work of the National Parole Board
is too fragile a link on which to found jurisdiction against him
as an individual. The causes of action asserted against the
individual defendants are not attributable to any fountainhead
source of federal law, but emanate from provincial law relating
to tortious liability.
The lack of jurisdiction over the Chairman personally did
not, however, automatically foreclose a claim of vicarious liabil
ity against the Crown for wrongful acts of its servants. The
vicarious liability of the Crown and the right of action against
it are created by the Crown Liability Act, so that the claim is
founded on federal law.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), s. 15.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.)
[R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada
Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Consti
tution Act, 1982, Item 1), ss. 91, 101.
Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, ss. 3(1)(a),
4(2).
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s.
17(4)(b).
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 303(1),
402(3), 420, 424, 427, 1716(2).
Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-7l-72, c. 63.
Narcotic Control Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1041, ss. 53,
58, 59.
Parole Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, ss. 3(2) (as am. by S.C.
1986, c. 42, s. 1), 4(3).
Penitentiary Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
ITO--International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida
Electronics Inc. et al., [1986] I S.C.R. 752; 68 N.R. 241;
Varnam v. Canada (Minister of National Health and
Welfare), [1988] 2 F.C. 454 (C.A.); Stephens' Estate v.
Minister of National Revenue, Wilkie, Morrison, Smith,
Stratham (Deputy Sheriff, County of Oxford), Constable
Ross and Davidson (1982), 40 N.R. 620 (F.C.A.).
DISTINGUISHED:
Oag v. Canada, [1987] 2 F.C. 511; 73 N.R. 149 (C.A.).
CONSIDERED:
Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. v. R., [ 1980] 1 F.C. 86
(C.A.); affg. [1979] 2 F.C. 476 (T.D.).
REFERRED TO:
Rhine v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442; 34 N.R. 290.
COUNSEL:
Nancy Matheson for plaintiff.
Mitchell Taylor for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Pierce, van Loon, Vancouver, for plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant.
The following are the reasons for order ren
dered in English by
MCNAIR J.: This is an application by the plain
tiff for leave to amend the statement of claim and
to add as party defendants to the action the former
Chairman of the National Parole Board, William
R. Outerbridge, and the presently fictitious
defendants, John Doe and Jane Doe. The applica
tion is made pursuant to Federal Court Rules
[C.R.C., c. 663] 303(1), 420, 424, 427 and
1716(2).
An original statement of claim was filed on June
11, 1987. The defendant filed an appearance pur
suant to Rule 402(3) on July 6, 1987. A defence in
the form of a general denial was filed on Septem-
ber 8, 1987. On January 27, 1988' an amended
defence was filed.
Essentially, the plaintiff's cause of complaint
giving rise to this action in tort for damages is the
failure of the Solicitor General to renew her
appointment as a member of the National Parole
Board by reason of alleged discrimination based on
sex, religion and political affiliation. The plaintiff
was appointed as a member of the Board for an
initial term of one year, following which she was
reappointed for a further period of three years on
April 1, 1982. She claims to have been wrongfully
dismissed without cause on or about June 11,
1985.
Counsel for the defendant has agreed to the
proposed amendments in so far as they relate
solely to the Crown, subject to plaintiff's counsel
agreeing to the filing of an amended statement of
defence in response thereto. Hence, the sole issues
to be determined are whether this Court has juris
diction over the causes of action alleged against
William R. Outerbridge, John Doe and Jane Doe,
as pleaded in paragraphs 3, 4, 21 and 22 of the
statement of claim and the claim of vicarious
liability on the part of the Crown as set out in
paragraph 15 thereof. The contentious paragraphs
read as follows:
3. The Defendant, William R. Outerbridge (hereinafter
referred to as "Outerbridge"), was at all times material to this
action the Chairman of the National Parole Board, and an
agent, servant or employee of the Solicitor General, and resides
at 534 Golden, Ottawa, Ontario, K2A 2E7.
4. John Doe and Jane Doe are persons unknown who conspired
with Outerbridge to deny or infringe the Plaintiff's rights and
freedoms.
15. The Solicitor General is vicariously liable for the actions of
Outerbridge.
21. Outerbridge conspired with John Doe, Jane Doe and other
persons unknown to unlawfully prevent the Plaintiff from
receiving her initial appointment to the National Parole Board
and further conspired with John Doe, Jane Doe and other
persons unknown to prevent her reappointment to the National
Parole Board, and maliciously misinformed the Minister
responsible, and the Prime Minister with respect to the Plain
tiff, all with the intent to deny or infringe the Plaintiff's rights
and freedoms, and deprive her of her employment and con
tinued employment.
22. Further or in the alternative, Outerbridge discriminated
against the Plaintiff by misinforming, or not informing at all
the Minister responsible and the Prime Minister, and others, or
any of them, with respect to the Plaintiff's capabilities, and the
said misinformation or failure to inform was motivated by
Outerbridge's bias, and prejudice against the Plaintiff on the
basis of her sex, religion and/or political affiliation and Outer-
bridge thereby denied or infringed the Plaintiff's rights and
freedoms, and violated the Charter, and caused the Plaintiff
loss, damage and expense.
The plaintiff insists that the Court has jurisdic
tion to entertain the pleaded causes of action and
further maintains that it is necessary that these
three defendants be added in order to ensure that
all matters in dispute in the action may be fully
adjudicated upon by the Court.
In order to determine whether a particular
matter is within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court, it is necessary to satisfy the requirements of
the test prescribed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in ITO—International Terminal Opera
tors Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. et al., [1986] 1
S.C.R. 752; 68 N.R. 241. Mr. Justice McIntyre,
writing for the majority, set out the legal criteria,
at pages 766 S.C.R.; 256-257 N.R.:
The general extent of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court has
been the subject of much judicial consideration in recent years.
In Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, and in McNamara Construction (West-
ern) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, the essential
requirements to support a finding of jurisdiction in the Federal
Court were established. They are:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the
federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing body of federal law which is
essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes
the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be "a law of
Canada" as the phrase is used in s. 101 'of the Constitution
Act, 1867.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the first
part of the test is met by paragraph 17(4)(b) of
the Federal Court Act [R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.),
c. 10], which reads as follows:
17....
(4) The Trial Division has concurrent original jurisdiction
(b) in proceedings in which relief is sought against any
person for anything done or omitted to be done in the
performance of his duties as an officer or servant of the
Crown.
It was not strenuously contended that Mr.
Outerbridge was not an officer or a servant of the,
Crown for the purposes of the test, but counsel for
the defendant does not concede the point.
Plaintiff's counsel alluded to the appointment of
Board members by the Governor in Council and
the designation by that executive authority of one
of such members to be Chairman and another to
be Vice-Chairman, as provided by subsections 3(1)
and 3(2) of the Parole Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, as
amended by S.C. 1986, c. 42, s. 1. She also
stressed the fact that subsection 4(3) of the Act
designated the Chairman as the chief executive
officer of the Board and charged him with general
supervision over the work and the staff of the
Board.
The statutory provisions relied on read as
follows:
3. (I) There shall be a board, to be known as the National
Parole Board, consisting of not more than thirty-six members to
be appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during
good behaviour for a period not exceeding ten years.
(2) The Governor in Council shall designate one of the
members to be Chairman and one to be Vice-Chairman.
4. ...
(3) The Chairman is the chief executive officer of the Board
and has supervision over and direction of the work and the staff
of the Board.
The second branch of the test enunciated by
ITO, supra, requires that there be an existing
body of federal law which is essential to the dispo
sition of the case and which nourishes the statu
tory grant of jurisdiction. Counsel for the plaintiff
contends that Outerbridge and the fictitious Doe
defendants conspired illegally to bring about the
plaintiff's dismissal from the National Parole
Board, thereby denying her equality rights and
discriminating against her in violation of section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free
doms [being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.)]. Counsel further submits that there is a
strong likelihood of evidence being brought out
during pre-trial discoveries that might show that
Outerbridge played a prominent role as chief
executive officer of the Board in influencing the
Cabinet decision not to reappoint the plaintiff as a
member of the Board.
Counsel for the plaintiff relies heavily on an
obiter statement in the case of Varnam v. Canada
(Minister of National Health and Welfare),
[1988] 2 F.C. 454, a decision of the Federal Court
of Appeal. The statement was to the effect that the
Trial Judge may not have been wrong in her
refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's claim on a prelim
inary motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
where it was possible that evidence at trial might
establish that the defendant played a decisive,
consultative role in influencing the Minister's deci
sion. This statement seems somewhat at odds with
the actual result of the Court's decision, which was
to uphold the appeal and dismiss the plaintiff's
action as against the defendant College. In any
event, plaintiff's counsel makes the analogy that
the second ITO test is met by pleading allegations
of Charter violations vis-Ã -vis the administration
of the Parole Act, where there was some possibility
of evidence going to show Outerbridge's decisive
role in influencing the Crown's decision to dismiss
the plaintiff.
The third criterion of the ITO test requires that
the law on which the case for jurisdiction is based
must be "a law of Canada" as the phrase is used in
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [30 &
31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II,
No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.), Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982,
Item 1)].
It is urged here that the Charter is clearly a
matter of federal law, falling within federal legis
lative competence under the general peace, order
and good government power accorded by
section 91 of the Act as well as coming within the
federal powers with respect to criminal law and
the establishment, maintenance and management
of penitentiaries under subsections 91(27) and
91(28) respectively.
Counsel for the plaintiff argues that if the Court
finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the causes
of action alleged against the additional defendants
then the issue of vicarious liability on the part of
the Crown will automatically follow. Alternatively,
she submits that if the Court determines that it
lacks such jurisdiction then the Crown is still
vicariously liable for the actions complained of on
the part of Outerbridge, citing Stephens' Estate v.
Minister of National Revenue, Wilkie, Morrison,
Smith, Stratham (Deputy Sheriff County of
Oxford), Constable Ross and Davidson (1982), 40
N.R. 620 (F.C.A.). I prefer to leave this submis
sion for the moment and will deal with it later.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the individual
causes of action against the persons identified in
paragraphs 3, 4, 15, 21 and 22 of the amended
statement of claim. He characterizes these causes
ofaction as constituting the torts of conspiracy
and deceit, and submits that they are founded on
provincial and not federal law. Thus, he urges that
the plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of
the second and third branches of the test criteria
prescribed by ITO in that there is no existing body
of applicable federal law to underpin the jurisdic
tion of the Federal Court with respect to the
causes of action alleged against the individual
defendants. In short, there exists no body of feder
al law essential to the disposition of the case.
In my view, the issue on this aspect of the case is
whether there is a sufficient jurisdictional nexus
between the causes of action alleged against the
individual defendants and some existing body of
federal law "which is essential to the disposition of
the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of
jurisdiction" within the second branch of the ITO
test.
Defendants' counsel buttressed his submission
by citing Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. v. R.,
[1980] 1 F.C. 86 (C.A.); affg. [1979] 2 F.C. 476
(T.D.). Essentially, this case held that while para
graph 17(4)(b) of the Federal Court Act permits
servants of the Crown to be sued in the Federal
Court, the mere fact of impleading them in that
forum does not constitute an existing body of
federal law sufficient to entertain actions in negli
gence against them, which are clearly matters of
provincial law.
Similarly, in Stephens' Estate v. M.N.R., supra,
the Federal Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that
paragraph 17(4)(b) of the Federal Court Act was
insufficient to found jurisdiction to entertain the
action as against individual defendants because the
claims against them were based on tort and not
federal law, notwithstanding the involvement of
the Income Tax Act [S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63].
Mr. Justice Le Dain, writing the unanimous
opinion of the Court, put it this way, at page 630:
In the present case, despite the necessary application of the
provisions of the Income Tax Act to the question of validity or
legal justification, the right to damages cannot be said to be
provided for by federal law. 1f it exists at all, it is created by
provincial law. The applicable federal law does not purport to
create or provide for this right.
The Varnam case, supra, is the most recent
pronouncement of the Federal Court of Appeal on
the question of statutory jurisdiction. Here, the
plaintiff was a physician whose authorization to
prescribe the drug methadone was revoked under a
notice issued pursuant to sections 53, 58 and 59 of
the Narcotic Control Regulations [C.R.C., c.
1041]. By the terms of section 58 of the Regula
tions, the Minister could only act "after consulta
tion with" the College. The action against the
College was founded upon tortious claims of negli
gent misrepresentation and conspiracy to inten
tionally interfere with his right and ability to carry
on his profession. The College moved to have the
action against it dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Trial Judge dismissed the motion [[1987] 3
F.C. 185] on the ground that the claim against the
College was so intertwined with the claim against
the Crown as to bring the action within the Court's
jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's counsel bases her case for adding the
individual defendants on the decision of the Feder
al Court of Appeal in Oag v. Canada, [1987] 2
F.C. 511; 73 N.R. 149 in which a prisoner, whose
mandatory supervision had been wrongly revoked,
was successful in persuading the Court that an
action in tort for damages lay against the individu
al defendants as officers of the National Parole
Board who participated in the wrongful revocation.
It was argued [at page 517] that the circumstances
surrounding the prisoner's detention and release
were governed by the provisions of the Parole Act
and the Penitentiary Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6],
which constituted "a detailed statutory framework
and scheme of regulation in existing and appli-
cable federal law sufficient to underpin the juris
diction of the Federal Court of Canada".
Stone J. stated the following reasons for the
Court's decision at pages 520-521 F.C.; 155-156
N.R.:
There thus appears, to use the phrase of Laskin, C.J.C., in
the Rhine and Prytula' case, "a detailed statutory framework"
of federal law under which the appellant not only acquired the
right to be free but also the right to remain so. It must be
emphasized that, as he remained under sentence, the quality of
freedom he enjoyed was not the same as that possessed by a
person not under sentence. Its limits were demarcated by
federal statutes. If the torts of false arrest and imprisonment
were committed as alleged, they were committed because his
right to remain free thus delineated was interfered with. I do
not think that law need expressly provide a remedy for such
interference for the claims to be governed by it. These torts, in
my view, depend for their existence upon federal law; any
provable damages resulting from their commission are recover
able in the Trial Division. I have concluded that the claims are
provided for in the "laws of Canada" or "federal law".
Mr. Justice Hugessen distinguished Oag from
Varnam on the basis that the wrongful act com
plained of in the former case sprang from the twin
statutory sources of the Parole Act and the Peni
tentiary Act, whereas the mere consultative pro
cess envisaged by section 58 of the Narcotic Con
trol Regulations in Varnam seemed "far too thin a
thread on which to hang the jurisdiction of this
Court" [at page 459]. I fully endorse his percep
tive distinction.
In my opinion, the tortious claims asserted
against the individual defendants do not derive
from an existing body of federal law governing
liability in the context of providing a "detailed
statutory framework" sufficient to fasten liability
on such defendants. The fact that the defendant
Outerbridge was the chief executive officer
charged with general supervision over the work
and affairs of the National Parole Board is far too
fragile a link on which to found jurisdiction
against him in his individual capacity. Under the
' Rhine v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 442; 34 N.R. 290.
circumstances, I find that the causes of action
asserted against the individual defendants are not
attributable to any fountainhead source of federal
law but rather, if they exist at all, are the emana
tions of provincial law relating to tortious liability.
That being so, the part of the motion seeking leave
to add William R. Outerbridge, John Doe and
Jane Doe as party defendants is refused.
Counsel for the plaintiff makes the point that
even if the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction
over the defendants Outerbridge and John and
Jane Doe then it is still possible for the Crown to
be held vicariously liable for the part they played
as officers or servants of the Crown in bringing
about the plaintiff's downfall as a member of the
National Parole Board. She further maintains that
the allegations pleaded in paragraphs 3, 4, 21 and
22 of the amended statement of claim are suffi
cient to support the claim of vicarious liability on
the part of the Solicitor General as pleaded in
paragraph 15.
Defendants' counsel objects that paragraph 15
does nothing more than plead a proposition of law.
He further maintains that the remaining para
graphs 3, 4, 21 and 22 should not be allowed to
stand as substantiating the plea of vicarious liabili
ty, assuming that the amendment designed to imp-
lead these individuals personally is refused.
Plaintiff's counsel counters with the argument
that the whole foundation of the plaintiff's action
revolves around the matter of appointments to the
National Parole Board and the actions of the then
Chairman, which are said to constitute the torts of
conspiracy and misfeasance in public office. The
result, in her submission, is that the Solicitor
General can still be held vicariously liable for the
wrongful acts of the Chairman and his conspira
torial associates, notwithstanding the fact that
they cannot be sued personally in the Federal
Court. As indicated, she supports this submission
by citing the case of Stephens' Estate, supra, and
makes reference to the statutory provisions alluded
to therein, namely, paragraph 3(1)(a) and subsec
tion 4(2) of the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. C-38, which read as follows:
3. (1) The Crown is liable in tort for the damages for which,
if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be
liable
(a) in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown,
or
4....
(2) No proceedings lie against the Crown by virtue of
paragraph 3(1)(a) in respect of any act or omission of a servant
of the Crown unless the act or omission would apart from the
provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of action in tort
against that servant or his personal representative.
I agree with the submission of plaintiff's counsel
that the lack of jurisdiction against Outerbridge
personally does not automatically foreclose a claim
of vicarious liability against the Crown, as repre
sented by the Solicitor General, for any acts of
misfeasance on the part of Outerbridge as an
officer of the National Parole Board. The very
point was decided in Stephens' Estate v. M.N.R.,
supra, where Mr. Justice Le Dain stated the issue
and the result, at page 631 as follows:
The Trial Division allowed the Crown's application on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims
for damages against it. This conclusion appeared to be treated
as following necessarily from the decision that the court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the action as against the defendants
other than the Crown. I cannot agree with this conclusion.
Anomalous as it may seem that the court should have jurisdic
tion to entertain an action for the vicarious liability of the
Crown, when it would not have jurisdiction to entertain an
action against the Crown servants for whose acts the Crown is
to be held liable, I cannot see how that anomaly is to be
avoided. The vicarious liability of the Crown and the right of
action against it are created by paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Crown
Liability Act and would not exist apart from it. Thus it appears
to be undeniable that the claim is founded on federal law.
Whether the acts of the defendants other than the Crown
would give rise to a cause of action in tort, for purposes of
subsection 4(2) of the Act, must be determined by what, in an
action against them, would have to be considered provincial
law, but that cannot, in my respectful opinion, make the
vicarious liability of the Crown for those acts any less a cause
of action founded on federal law when it is so clearly provided
for by the Crown Liability Act. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, I disallow the application for leave
to amend by adding as party defendants William
R. Outerbridge and the unknown parties, John
Doe and Jane Doe, and their names are stricken
accordingly from the style of cause. Thus, the
statement of claim is rendered innocuous and inef
fective with respect to its capability for sustaining
any basis of personal liability on the part of
anyone but the Crown. In my view, the allegations
pleaded in paragraphs 3, 15, 21 and 22 of the
statement of claim raise a reasonably arguable
case that the Solicitor General may well be vicari
ously liable for the actions of Outerbridge as an
officer or servant of the Crown. Amended para
graph 4 serves no practical purpose in substantiat
ing the plea of vicarious liability and is therefore
disallowed. If it should become apparent later that
other officers or servants of the Crown acted in
concert with Outerbridge in wrongfully abusing
and infringing the plaintiff's rights then an appro
priate amendment can be sought at that time to
name them as fellow conspirators in the plot.
In the result, my decision is to permit para
graphs 3, 15, 21 and 22 of the amended statement
of claim to stand, but on the basis that the two
last-mentioned paragraphs be re-numbered as
paragraphs 4 and 5 and with the deletion from
former paragraph 21 (now paragraph 4) of any
specific reference to "John Doe, Jane Doe". The
remaining paragraphs of the statement of claim
can be re-numbered accordingly. Plaintiff's coun
sel may wish to consider adding a further para
graph by way of pleading the particular sections of
the Crown Liability Act relied on and any addi
tional facts deemed requisite for bringing the case
within the purview of the statutory provisions. In
any event, particulars can always be utilized for
narrowing or bringing into clearer focus the issue
of vicarious liability. The defendant shall have, of
course, the usual period of thirty days for filing a
defence to the amended statement of claim. Costs
of the application shall be to the defendant in the
cause.
An order will go accordingly.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.