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CEA-3-88
Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (Plaintiff)
v.
Her Majesty the Queen (Defendant)
INDEXED AS: QUEBEC (COMMISSION DE LA SANTÉ ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ DU TRAVAIL) V. CANADA (T.D.)
Trial Division, Addy J.—Ottawa, November 14, 15, 16 and December 22, 1989.
Access to information Canada Evidence Act, ss. 36.1(1),(2), 36.2(1) In action claiming damages for negli gence, plaintiff seeking disclosure of deleted information in Canadian Armed Forces investigative inquiry report on use of military firearm and ammunition in shooting in Quebec Na tional Assembly Public interest in non-disclosure out weighing that in disclosure as disclosure injurious to national defence or security Deletions referring to security systems, codes and access control monitoring equipment, base defence installations, firearm and ammunition inventory Strategic importance of particular military base Judge examining material as to relevance, balancing of competing public inter ests in view of Crown's possible conflict of interest.
Armed forces Disclosure of information re national defence or security, ss. 36.1(1),(2), 36.2(1) Canada Evidence Act Plaintiff, in action claiming damages for negligence, seeking disclosure of deleted information in military investiga tive inquiry report re Corporal Denis Lortie's use of military firearm and ammunition in shooting incident in Quebec Na tional Assembly As deletions referring to location and operation of security systems, security codes and access con trol monitoring equipment, base defence installations, number and type of firearms and ammunition in stock and as base of national strategic importance, public interest in non-disclosure outweighing that in disclosure.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, ss. 36.1(1),(2), 36.2(1) (as added by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111, Schedule III, s. 4).
Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-3.
COUNSEL:
Jean -Félix Brassard for plaintiff.
Jean-Marc Aubry, Q.C. and René Leblanc for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Flynn, Rivard, Québec, for plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
ADDY J.: On May 8, 1984 Corporal Denis Lortie, a soldier with the Canadian Forces, Regu lar Force, using a submachine gun and ammuni tion obtained without authorization from the Carp Military Base in Ontario, burst into the Quebec National Assembly and shot several people, three of whom were killed and nine wounded. It was also alleged that several others suffered nervous shock as a result of the shooting.
The plaintiff, an organization of the province of Quebec, is responsible inter alia for administering the province's Workmen's Compensation Act [R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-3]. As part of this responsibili ty, it has compensated the victims injured and the dependants of those who died. It will also in some cases have to continue paying compensation.
In an action brought in the Federal Court, the plaintiff claimed repayment for the amounts which it had to pay and will have to pay in the future to compensate the injured and the beneficiaries of deceased persons. It based its claim on allegations that the defendant was negligent in not exercising effective control over the weapons and ammunition stored at Carp and in not providing adequate supervision of personnel in this regard, in particu lar of Corporal Denis Lortie.
Carp Military Base, located some twenty kilom eters from Ottawa, in addition to serving as a communications control point for Canadian naval, air and land forces, located both outside and inside Canada, also includes premises which, in the event of a nuclear war or a major conflict, could serve as a refuge for the Cabinet and National Defence Command, and from which the CBC could trans mit emergency instructions to the public.
Corporal Lortie was assigned to the headquar ters detachment on the base for the storing and maintenance of weapons and ammunition. As such he was among the four persons who had access to the vault where they were stored.
On May 15, 1984 the Canadian Forces initiated an inquiry into the removal of weapons and ammu nition from the Carp Base by Corporal Lortie. The relevant paragraphs of the order of Brigadier Gen eral Simpson, Commander, Communication Com mand for Canadian Forces, convening the military inquiry Board read as follows:
2. The Board shall investigate and report upon the circum stances surrounding the removal of firearms and ammunition from CFS Carp, allegedly by Cpl D. Lortie, a member of the Canadian Forces, Regular Force, culminating in the alleged subsequent use of these firearms and ammunition in a shooting incident in Quebec City on 8 May 1984.
4. The Board shall establish and maintain liaison with appro priate officers of the Quebec Provincial Police, and any other civil police force which may be involved, to ensure that the Board's investigation does not in any way interfere with or prejudice the conduct of the investigation(s) conducted by civil authorities.
5. Subject to paragraph 4 above, the Board shall obtain state ments from all available witnesses, and in particular shall record evidence and make findings as to:
(a) the position, duties and functions of Cpl Lortie at CFS Carp;
(b) the weapon(s) allegedly found in Cpl Lortie's possession at the time of his arrest in Quebec City, including ownership, the circumstances under which he obtained it or them, and whether his acquisition was duly authorized;
(c) regulations and procedures in effect at CFS Carp for the custody, control, and issue of firearms and ammunition, and whether these regulations and procedures are adequate for the purpose;
(d) whether the regulations and procedures referred to in subparagraph c. above, and other applicable regulations and procedures, were complied with; and
(e) such other findings as the Board may consider relevant and appropriate, having regard to the nature and purpose of the inquiry.
The inquiry Board, headed by Lieutenant Colo nel A. R. K. Martineau (now Colonel Martineau) consisted of four officers. It submitted its report to Brigadier General Simpson on June 8, 1984, in which the purpose of the inquiry was described in the following way:
Investigation and reporting upon the circumstances surround ing the removal of firearms and ammunition from CFS Carp, allegedly by Cpl D. Lortie, a member of the Canadian Forces
Regular Force, culminating in the alleged subsequent use of these firearms and ammunition in a shooting incident in Quebec City on 8 May 1984.
In response to a request for disclosure in the action, the defendant sent the plaintiff a copy of the inquiry report. However, certain words and some complete sentences were deleted. A second request was made for disclosure of the full report and the defendant refused to disclose the deleted portions, indicating by affidavit that the disclosure would be likely to adversely affect national defence. The defendant based its refusal to pro duce the deleted portions of the report on subsec tion 36.1(1) of the Canada Evidence Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 (as added by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111, Schedule III, s. 4], which reads as follows:
36.1 (I) A Minister of the Crown in right of Canada or other person interested may object to the disclosure of informa tion before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information by certifying orally or in writing to the court, person or body that the information should not be disclosed on the grounds of a specified public interest.
In the case at bar the plaintiff submitted to me, as the designated judge in this matter, an applica tion for disclosure in accordance with the provi sions of subsection 36.2(1) [as added idem]:
36.2 (1) Where an objection to the disclosure of information is made under subsection 36.1(1) on grounds that the disclosure would be injurious to international relations or national defence or security, the objection may be determined, on application, in accordance with subsection 36.1(2) only by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, or such other judge of that court as the Chief Justice may designate to hear such applications.
In an analysis of subsection 36.2(1), counsel for the plaintiff sought to distinguish the application at bar, which may involve injury to national defence, from all earlier cases in which there was a possibility of injury to national security. Simply from reading the wording of this subsection, I cannot accept his argument. Also, injury to nation al defence would by the same token be injury to national security, since national defence exists only to ensure the protection and security of the nation.
The alarm and control systems designed to pre vent unauthorized removal of weapons and ammu nition stored at the Carp Base may be considered
in two quite different ways. First, they may be viewed in terms of the important part they play in the defence of the Base as a military facility. Second, the security provisions for these weapons and ammunition may be considered in relation to the unauthorized use which may be made of them by personnel of the armed forces or members of the public, quite apart from the fact that they are intended for military protection of the base. Only the second aspect is relevant in the case before the Federal Court. Further, since the admitted facts establish that it actually was Corporal Lortie, as a member of the military staff on the Base, who took the submachine gun and ammunition for this weapon, measures to prevent unauthorized entry of other persons to the Base in general or to the vault in particular are not really relevant.
On account of his assignment to the Base, Cor poral Lortie necessarily had a right of entry. The nature and effectiveness of the regulations and measures in effect, and the way they were put into practice to prevent unauthorized use of weapons and ammunition by members of the military per sonnel on the Base, are very relevant to the case at bar. In particular, it is relevant to consider the existence or non-existence of measures affecting entry to the vault, the taking of weapons and ammunition and their removal from the vault and the Base.
A very important distinction has to be made in comparing the significance of the document at issue with the documents dealt with in all the earlier cases involving subsection 36.2(1) of the Canada Evidence Act. In the case at bar the military inquiry and the subject-matter of the case are precisely the same: the question as to how Corporal Lortie got hold of the weapon and ammunition in view of the existence and applica tion of orders, decrees and measures which were or should have been in effect to prevent unauthorized removal. There is no need to consider the wording of the order authorizing the military inquiry, cited above, to appreciate its general relevance.
Since the general purpose of the inquiry con ducted in 1984 is so closely connected with the reasons put forward by the plaintiff in its case, the
circumstances affecting the application for disclo sure differ substantially from those dealt with in the other cases cited by the both parties. In all the earlier cases in which an application for disclosure under subsection 36.2(1) was at issue it was alleged that there was a possibility, or in some cases a probability, that the documents the Gov ernment refused to disclose could contain evidence useful to the applicant. Documents dealing directly with a common subject were not involved.
The Court must also consider that it is in fact the Crown, defendant in the action for damages, who through certain members of the Department of Defence is relying on the non-disclosure of certain parts of its inquiry report. According to the allegations of the plaintiff, that Department and certain members of its security organization may have been guilty of negligence in the storage and custody of the weapons. There is thus a possible conflict of interest.
For these reasons, and especially in view of the general relevance of the report, I decided at the hearing, contrary to the procedure adopted in the other applications under subsection 36.2(1), that when there could be the slightest doubt as to the relevance of an excluded part of the report I would examine it, first, to decide on the question of relevance, and in the event of an affirmative response, to decide whether the public interest in non-disclosure in protecting national defence takes priority over the public interest in each individual having a right of access to any evidence useful to his case.
In the great majority of cases, when the exclu sion of only one or two words in a sentence or paragraph was at issue, it was easy in the circum stances to decide on the relevance of the excluded portion without examining the deleted words. This procedure was adopted. It was only when I believed that the information might be relevant, or when in view of the number of words excluded in a sentence or paragraph its meaning or application could not be determined, that I decided to consult the original text.
An important consideration arises from the alle gation that Corporal Lortie was not on duty when
he took the weapons. The Court must also consider that the break-in occurred during a period when soldiers were not on duty in the vault and it was expected that special security precautions would be in effect to further limit access to it.
After hearing arguments on the relevance of various passages from the expurgated report, by counsel for both parties, the hearing continued in camera in the absence of the plaintiff and its counsel for detailed examination of the unexpur gated report. During this part of the hearing, further representations and arguments were made to the Court by counsel for the defendant regard ing the application and significance of the expur gated words.
In the great majority of cases, it was clear that the expurgated words or the context as a whole in which they occurred had no relevance. In three places, the words or sentences deleted are relevant. In four other places, it might be argued that there is some relevance. It is undoubtedly of secondary and marginal interest.
Considering the intrinsic validity of the objec tions made in the affidavit of Major Harris, the Carp Military Base Commanding Officer, and after hearing the explanations made by counsel for the defendant, I have to conclude that in each case where the deleted words are relevant or could be relevant, the objections to disclosure are firmly based on a real probability of a danger that nation al defence might be compromised if the words or expressions expurgated were known to the public. The expurgated passages referred either to the existing security systems, their location and meth ods of operation, the codes and equipment to con trol access to the vault, the existing resources for defence of the Base or to the number and nature of weapons and ammunition used for that purpose.
In view of the critical role both in military and political terms that the Carp Base is intended to play in a major conflict, it is hard to imagine a place where preservation of security both as regards access and the means and systems of defence would be more important.
In the circumstances of the application at bar, I must conclude that the public interest resulting from non-disclosure predominates and is of greater importance than the public interest in disclosure.
I would just note that certain words expurgated from the report, including those mentioned in paragraph 14 of Colonel Martineau's affidavit, were disclosed to counsel for the defendant by consent at the hearing.
Costs are reserved to the trial judge.
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