T-1042-86
T-1090-86
T-1200-86
Information Commissioner of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Minister of External Affairs (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: CANADA (INFORMATION COMMISSIONER) v.
CANADA (MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS) (T.D.)
Trial Division, Muldoon J.—Ottawa, April 26 and
August 28, 1990.
Access to information — Applications to review deemed
refusal to disclose records relating to free trade negotiations
with U.S.A. — Respondent conceding extensions of time limits
not justified, but arguing application moot as records eventu
ally released — Commissioner entitled to judicial determina
tion under Access to Information Act, s. 42(1)(a) — "Any
refusal" in s. 42(1)(a) including deemed refusal — Judicial
scrutiny unrestricted — Purpose of review to let other poten
tial respondents know where they stand, not just to secure
admission of tardiness in instant case — Purpose of Act to
force change of public servants' reluctance to release govern
ment information.
These were applications for a review under Access to Infor
mation Act, paragraph 42(1)(a) of the deemed refusal by the
Minister of External Affairs to disclose records related to free
trade negotiations with the U.S.A. The issues revolved around
the tardiness of the respondent's high departmental managers
in complying with the requests for access to information within
the primary time frame for so doing as well as extended times.
The respondent's counsel conceded that their conduct was so
tardy as to amount to "deemed refusals" to give access to the
information. The requesters complained to the Information
Commissioner, who found the complaints to be justified. A
week or so after the filing of these applications, or some six to
eight months after the original requests, the records were
released with an accompanying press kit. In asserting that the
Department of External Affairs acted unreasonably and outside
the spirit of the Act by obfuscating the reasons for the delays in
responding to the access requests, the applicant conceded that
she does not assert malice, only very great negligence. The
respondent denied any deliberate strategy to delay, or to obfus
cate. It conceded that the 120-days' extension invoked in regard
to each request was not justified, but urged the Court to decline
to accord discretionary declaratory relief because the issues
were moot in light of the eventual compliance. Furthermore, it
submitted that the Information Commissioner was attempting
to use the Court review process as a substitute for her own
investigation (under section 32 of the Act) and annual report to
the Minister (section 38) or special report to Parliament (sec-
tion 39).
Held, an order should go as asked.
The department had delayed unduly in responding to the
access requests; the extensions of time were not justified; the
Department acted negligently, ignorantly and outside the spirit
of the Act by obfuscating (without malice) the reasons for the
delays; and, being unjustified pursuant to section 9, the 120-day
extensions amounted to deemed refusals to disclose the request
ed records. The effect of these findings should accordingly be
declared in accordance with section 49.
The Commissioner is entitled to a judicial determination of
the matters under review. Paragraph 42(1)(a) accords the
choice of proceeding by application to the Court absolutely.
That right could not be thwarted by the untimely tendering of
concessions.
The term "any refusal" in paragraph 42(1)(a) includes a
deemed refusal, defined in subsection 10(3) as failing to give
access within the time limits set out in the Act. The content of
the "review of any refusal to disclose a record requested under
the Act" is unlimited. It means unrestricted judicial scrutiny
which may result in the granting of relief which is corrective,
directive, instructive and declaratory. This interpretation is
supported by the uniform ending expressed in sections 49, 50
and 51: "the Court ... shall make such other order as the
Court deems appropriate".
The purpose of the paragraph 42(1)(a) review is not just to
make the respondent acknowledge unreasonable tardiness, but
also to let all other potential respondents know where they
stand in these matters. Responding to requests is extra work for
the government departments, but when, as in the Access to
Information Act, Parliament lays down these additional respon
sibilities, there must be compliance. One of the principal pur
poses of the Act is to force a change of public servants' habitual
reluctance to give out government information.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Access to Information Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111
(Schedule), ss. 9, 10(3), 32, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50,
51, 53.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta v. Canada, [1987] 3 F.C. 383
(T.D.); affd A-155-87, Heald J.A., judgment dated
27/2/90, not yet reported; Mikaeli v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1990] 1 F.C. 562
(T.D.).
COUNSEL:
Michael L. Phelan, Patricia J. Wilson and
Paul B. Tetro for applicant.
Barbara A. McIsaac for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Ottawa, for
applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for order ren
dered in English by
MULDOON J.: Considering the subject-matter,
these are old files. The respective motions were
heard by the Court on April 26, 1990, and counsel
indicated that because of the effluxion of time, all
sense of urgency had even by then drained out of
these matters.
Each of the applicants made access requests
under the Access to Information Act, S.C. 1980-
81-82-83, c. 111 (the Act), Schedule I, as follows:
Leslie Shepherd—three; dated November 27, 1985, November
28, 1985, December 17, 1985
Bruce Campbell—one; dated December 3, 1985 Mr. Campbell
is stated to have been a researcher for Steven Langdon, M.P.,
and
Martin Cohn—two; dated September 30, 1985, December 9,
1985.
All three virtually identical notices of applica
tion reveal that an application will be made:
... pursuant to paragraph 42(1)(a) of the [Act] ... for a
review of the deemed refusal pursuant to subsection 10(3) of
the Act by the Respondent Minister ... to disclose certain
records requested under the Act by [the three applicants,
respectively] namely certain records related to free trade
negotiations with the United States of America, as set out in
[the above listed] access requests dated [as above noted] copies
of which are attached as exhibits ... to the affidavit of James
G. Long, filed.
Some ten months after the filing of the three
applications, the respondent, in December, 1986,
moved in each instance to have the respective
applications dismissed . . .
upon the ground that the applicant seeks a declaration as to an
issue which is academic and of no practical consequence . .
The aforesaid motions for dismissal came on to be
heard by the Associate Chief Justice who, on
January 28, 1987, made an order reserving his
disposition "until the main motion is heard".
The issues in these cases revolve around the
tardiness of the respondent's high departmental
managers in complying with the requests for
access to information within the primary time
frame for so doing as well as extended times. So
tardy were the respondent's high officials that, it is
conceded by the respondent's counsel, their con
duct amounted to "deemed refusals" to give access
to the information. This generated the requesters'
complaints to the Access to Information Commis
sioner (hereinafter, sometimes: the Commissioner)
and it is conceded that she, the Commissioner,
found that the requesters' complaints were well
founded.
The respondent, by counsel, "does not take issue
with the reconstruction by the . .. Commissioner
and her counsel of the facts relating to the process
ing of the requests which are in issue in this
application". It seems that every document of
proximate or remote relevance to these proceed
ings has been lodged in Court, producing an eye-
straining quantity of reading-materials. The facts
are recited on 23 foolscap sheets in volume IV of
the Commissioner's record. Those who thirst for
buckets of detail in the to-ing and fro-ing, may
find satisfaction in the reading.
A week or so after the filing of Shepherd's and
Campbell's cases in Court by the Commissioner,
that is, according to paragraph 55 of the appli
cant's statement of facts in her motion record, on
May 21, 1986, the records were released with an
accompanying press kit. Additional information
was released on May 29 and 30, 1986. Reference
is made to Simon Wade's affidavit, paragraph 26
and to James Gordon Long's affidavit in T-1200-
86, both found in the motion record volume I, tabs
10, 11 and 12 and tab 6 respectively. The last-
mentioned application, Cohn's, T-1200-86, was
instituted on May 26, 1986. The applicant's coun
sel, in Court, conceded that when he asserts in
paragraph 61(f) of volume IV of the applicant's
record that the preceding paragraphs 18 to 28
show that "the Department [of External Affairs]
acted unreasonably and outside the spirit of the
Act by obfuscating the reasons for the delays in
responding to the access requests during the course
of the Information Commissioner's investigation",
the applicant does not assert malice, only very
great negligence. It is just as well that counsel
made that concession, for the words surely do seem
to convey, if not malice, then very bad faith. On
this, the respondent is adamant that there was no
deliberate strategy by the respondent's high offi
cials to delay, or to obfuscate.
Most of the rest of the concessions proceed from
the respondent, by counsel, and they save the
applicant's counsel much effort by establishing
much of the applicant's case. Not only did the
respondent's counsel make concessions in her letter
dated February 11, 1987, lodged in all three files,
but the respondent's motion record has a confes
sional air about it, too. It proceeds, thus:
2. With respect to the findings which the Information Commis
sioner urges at paragraph 61 of her memorandum, the
Respondent has conceded from the outset of these proceedings
that there was a deemed refusal when the extended time limits
for responding to these requests were not met.
3. Similarly, the Respondent has conceded from the outset
that, in retrospect, no evidence is available to justify the
reasonableness of the 120 day extensions which were taken in
respect of these requests.
4. The Respondent has also conceded that it would have been
better had it released records to the requestors as they became
ready for release, rather than waiting until all of the records
were ready.
5. With respect to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 61, it is
submitted that there is nothing in the evidence to justify a
conclusion that the officials who were working on the process
ing of these requests proceeded only on the basis of the fact
that the extended time periods had not yet expired.
6. With respect to subparagraph (f) of paragraph 61, it is
submitted that there is nothing in the evidence to justify a
conclusion that the Respondent or officials within the Depart
ment deliberately obfuscated the reasons for the delays when
responding to the Information Commissioner's investigation.
7. It is respectfully submitted that the Information Commis
sioner is attempting to use the Court review process in this case
as a substitute for her own investigation, and that she had the
power to make a full investigation of the delays, to make
findings of fact, and to make a report of her findings to the
Minister and, if she felt it appropriate, to Parliament. It is
again respectfully submitted that the declaratory relief sought
by the Commissioner would serve no useful purpose, and that
this Court ought to exercise its discretion and decline to make
the findings requested by the Commissioner or issue the decla
ration which [sic] has been requested.
At the hearing of these matters, the respondent's
counsel noted that the records to which the appli
cant sought access related to a significant govern
ment initiative, free trade with the U.S.A. and to
Canada's negotiating position. She asserted, right
ly, that the information recorded had to be
reviewed very carefully. Granted. Even so, how
ever, that correct assertion does nothing to dilute
the concessions stated in the respondent's motion
record and earlier in the proceedings.
The Act provides alternative, or rather addition
al, approaches for the Commissioner to attempt in
order to exact compliance with the law on the part
of heads of government institutions. The Commis
sioner may commence an investigation pursuant to
section 32 of this Access to Information legisla
tion. More to the point of identifying and, in a
sense, denouncing, recalcitrance, bloody-minded
ness or negligence by heads of governmental insti
tutions, the Commissioner could comment or com
plain about it in an annual report (section 38) or a
special report (section 39) to Parliament.
It is, surely, for the Commissioner to decide
whether the somewhat diffused proceeding of
transmitting a report to the respective speakers of
the Senate and House of Commons pursuant to
section 40, when the complaint involves high offi
cials of the government of the day involved in a
significant government initiative—free trade,
here—would be as effective as direct application to
the Court, an objectively non-partisan adjudicator
which may make a review on grounds of law. The
choice of proceeding as the Information Commis
sioner now does, pursuant to paragraph 42(1)(a)
of the Act, is accorded absolutely by Parliament,
in the Act. The Commissioner's choice is not to be
gainsaid by any respondent on any grounds of
distaste, inconvenience or tendering late conces-
sions. The Commissioner is entitled to have a
judicial determination of the matters under review.
The pertinent legislative provisions are titled
"Review by the Federal Court", and they run as
follows:
41. Any person who has been refused access to a record
requested under this Act or a part thereof may, if a complaint
has been made to the Information Commissioner in respect of
the refusal, apply to the Court for a review of the matter within
forty-five days after the time the results of an investigation of
the complaint by the Information Commissioner are reported to
the complainant under subsection 37(2) or within such further
time as the Court may, either before or after the expiry of those
forty-five days, fix or allow.
42. (1) The Information Commissioner may
(a) apply to the Court, within the time limits prescribed by
section 41, for a review of any refusal to disclose a record
requested under this Act or a part thereof in respect of which
an investigation has been carried out by the Information
Commissioner, if the Commissioner has the consent of the
person who requested access to the record;
(b) appear before the Court on behalf of any person who has
applied for a review under section 41; or
(c) with leave of the Court, appear as a party to any review
applied for under section 41 or 44.
The term "any refusal" must include a deemed
refusal defined in subsection 10(3) as failing to
give access within the time limits set out in the
Act. The concurrence of the French language ver
sion of a statutory text with the English language
version where the latter expresses "any" and the
French language version expresses no specific
equivalent word, as is the case in paragraph
42(1)(a), is dealt with in Aerlinte Eireann Teo-
ranta v. Canada, [1987] 3 F.C. 383 (T.D.), at
page 395, upheld on appeal, A-155-87 [Heald
J.A., judgment dated 27/2/90, not yet reported],
and more recently in Mikaeli v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 1 F.C.
562 (T.D.) at page 569. The content of the "review
of any refusal to disclose a record requested under
the Act" is quite unlimited. It means therefore,
nothing less than unrestricted judicial scrutiny
which may result in measures or relief which are,
at least, corrective, directive, instructive and
declaratory. In effect Parliament accords the
plenitude of judicial supervision which is the hall
mark of a superior Court's jurisdiction. Parliament
imposes no restriction here.
The foregoing interpretation of the Court's role
in performing the review provided in the Act, is
supported by the uniform ending expressed in sec
tions 49, 50 and 51: "the Court . . . shall make
such other order as the Court deems appropriate",
and "la Cour rend une autre ordonnance si elle
l'estime indique."
Since there is no fundamental dispute as to the
facts and since the statement of facts together with
the relevant body of documents is truly volumi
nous, there is little point or utility in simply recit
ing everything here again. A few notations of the
course of events will suffice.
Paragraphs 41 through 49 of the stated facts
give an authentic appreciation of certain events.
Persons and acronyms need to be identified. Mr.
Bill Dymond was the contact-person for the Senior
Adviser and Coordinator of the Canada/U.S.
Trade Task Force, with the remarkable acronym:
UGBA. Mr. Derek H. Burney was the Associate
Under-Secretary for External Affairs. The Trade
Negotiator's Office, (the TNO), was headed by Mr.
Simon Reisman. The following are from the Infor
mation Commissioner's Motion Record, volume
41. By December 24, 1985, the officers in UGBA and the
Access unit had identified and vetted 355 documents. The
UGBA officer, however, indicated that he thought relevant
documentation consisting primarily of the sectoral studies
(Leslie Shepherd's requests) could still remain with UGBA and
had not yet been forwarded for processing.
Response to Interrogatories, Motion Record,
Volume II, Tab 16.2B
42. On December 24, 1985, at a departmental meeting chaired
by Derek Burney, it was decided that, of the 355 documents
retrieved as potentially relevant, only 31 studies and reports
needed to be reviewed. This review was to be carried out as a
matter of urgency to identify fully-releasable documents for
public release by Ministers Clark and Kelleher. The remaining
documents were to be processed under the Act. Eventually it
was 26 of these 31 records that were released, in whole or in
part, to the requestors in response to their requests.
Response to Interrogatories, Motion Record,
Volume II, Tab 16, Para. 3, Tab 16.3A
43. On December 27, 1985, the 355 documents originally
identified and recommended for release, severance or exemp-
tion, were reviewed by the UGBA officer and Mr. Dymond,
and the list of recommendations revised to reflect Mr.
Dymond's input. As of December 27, 1985, therefore, the
records eventually identified and released or withheld in
response to the access requests had been made the subject of
recommendations as to releasability by the Department.
Response to Interrogatories, Motion Record,
Volume II, Tab 16.2C
44. On January 10, 1986, Mr. Dymond sent a memorandum to
Mr. Burney outlining the access requests received and enclosing
a draft press release summarizing seven studies proposed to be
made available immediately. The seven studies proposed to be
released were the following contracted studies:
(1) Institute for Research on Public Policy (a survey of
existing literature);
(2) Informetrica Ltd. (macro-economic study);
(3) Data Resources (macro-economic study);
(4) Grey, Clark Inc. (the Autopact);
(5) Arnold and Porter (U.S. trade remedy laws);
(6) Lane study (the European experience); and
(7) Stone study (institutional considerations).
The memorandum also indicated that the C.D. Howe Institute
papers on issues associated with harmonization would be ready
sometime that month and could be considered for release soon
after receipt. The memorandum stated that all other material
sought would be denied under the appropriate provisions of the
Act.
Response to Interrogatories, Motion Record,
Volume II, Tab 16-12B
45. On January 27, 1986, Mr. Burney sent a memorandum to
Mr. Reisman at the Trade Negotiations Office discussing the
proposed release of the contracted studies and stressing the
urgency of the need for a decision "before delinquency itself
becomes the issue".
Productions to Wade Affidavit, Confidential
Motion Record, Volume III, Tab 22
46. The Trade Negotiations Office responded on February 10,
1986 with its concurrence and comments about release of the
seven studies.
Productions to Wade Affidavit, Confidential
Motion Record, Volume III, Tab 23
47. On February 21, 1986, the Access Coordinator sought
advice from departmental legal services about the applicability
of some of the proposed exemptions in respect of the 31 reports.
A preliminary response was provided on March 3, 1986. A final
response was provided on March 20, 1986.
Productions to Wade Affidavit, Confidential
Motion Record, Volume III, Tabs 25, 26
48. On April 11, 1986, the Access Coordinator sent the 31
documents to the Trade Negotiations Office for its review. The
Trade Negotiations Office provided its recommendations on the
documents on April 16 and 21, 1986. The Trade Negotiations
Office noted in its correspondence that one deadline for
responding had already passed and several were immediately
pending when it received the records for review.
Productions to Wade Affidavit, Motion
Record, Volume II, Tab 14.24;
Response to Interrogatories, Motion Record,
Volume II, Tab 16.13A, 16.13B
49. On or about April 28, 1986, Mr. Burney sent a memoran
dum to the Minister of International Trade seeking approval
for the release of three of the contracted studies. By this time
two of the previously identified contracted studies had already
been published.
Productions to Wade Affidavit, Motion
Record, Volume II, Tab 14.27
In regard to the 120-days' extension which the
respondent's officials invoked in regard to each
request, the respondent's counsel had to admit in
oral argument, "It now seems clear that the 120
days extension was, in fact, not justified." The
evidence surely bears out counsel's admission, as
indicated in the statement of facts, paragraphs 50
through 54. It is apparent that the consultations
which were undertaken by External Affairs with
other involved departments of government were
not initiated until March, 1986. They could have
started in December, 1985 or, more generously, in
January, 1986; and they could have been conclud
ed by late January or early February, 1986.
Section 9 of the Access to Information Act
states not only time limits, but also principles
which inform and vivify the Act and its operations:
9. (1) The head of a government institution may extend the
time limit set out in section 7 or subsection 8(1) in respect of a
request under this Act for a reasonable period of time, having
regard to the circumstances, if
(a) the request is for a large number of records or necessi
tates a search through a large number of records and meet
ing the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with
the operations of the government institution,
(b) consultations are necessary to comply with the request
that cannot reasonably be completed within the original time
limit, or
(c) notice of the request is given pursuant to subsection
28(1)
by giving notice of the extension and, in the circumstances set
out in paragraph (a) or (b), the length of the extension, to the
person who made the request within thirty days after the
request is received, which notice shall contain a statement that
the person has a right to make a complaint to the Information
Commissioner about the extension.
(2) Where the head of a government institution extends a
time limit under subsection (1) for more than thirty days, the
head of the institution shall give notice of the extension to the
Information Commissioner at the same time as notice is given
under subsection (1).
Given the statutory scope of this review, quite
properly invoked by the Commissioner, and in
view of the concessions and admissions made on
the respondent's behalf in regard to the undisputed
facts presented, the Court, upon review of each of
the requesters' cases, is surely in a position to
make further findings, like the above conclusion
about the 120-days' extension, and declarations of
principle. The respondent's counsel argues as per
suasively as possible that the issues are all now
moot, and so would be declaratory relief. She notes
that the according of declaratory relief is discre
tionary, and she urges the Court to decline to
accord it, because of the futility of these proceed
ings brought by the Information Commissioner, in
view of the respondent's late compliance after the
institution of these proceedings in two of the cases.
Conceding that the evidence shows, with 20-20
hindsight that the requests could have been proc
essed more quickly, on the respondent's behalf, she
accepts that in responding to these and future
requests the respondent "must, however, proceed
as expeditiously as possible". Counsel's ultimate
plea at the hearing was that in view of the forego
ing, the applications ought to be dismissed,
because the Court's discretion to allow them ought
to be declined.
These are not cases for declining to exercise the
salutary powers of review conferred on the Court
by Parliament. Confession that such requests
ought to be processed as expeditiously as possible
may be good for an individual's soul, but it has no
didactic energy in gaining the attention of govern
ment departments. It has no effect in actually
providing legally that less than expeditious proc
essing of requests for information is breaking the
law, as it surely is. The purpose of the review is not
just to make the particular respondent acknowl
edge unreasonable tardiness. It is, also, to let all
the other potential respondents know where they
stand in these matters. The Court is quite con-
scious that responding to such requests is truly
"extra work" which is extraneous to the line
responsibilities and very raison d'être of govern
ment departments and other information-holding
organizations of government. But when, as in the
Access to Information Act, Parliament lays down
these pertinent additional responsibilities, then one
must comply.
After much consideration, the Court concludes
that the findings and declarations sought by the
Commissioner are amply supported by the evi
dence, and are all justified, except for any possible
inference of deliberately "obfuscating the reasons
for the delays in responding to the access requests
during the course of the Information Commission
er's investigation". The evidence, rather, suggests
confusion, ignorance and negligence which are at
least not ignoble, but constitute no reason to award
laurels, either. It cannot be doubted that one prin
cipal purpose of the Act is to force a change of
public servants' habitual, ingrained reluctance to
give out the government's information, even apart
from the obvious, stated limitations on access.
The Court finds, therefore, that
(a) the respondent's department delayed unduly in
responding to the access requests, which could
have been achieved easily by late January or early
February, 1986 instead of by late May, 1986;
(b) the 120-day extensions of time invoked in
response to the requesters' access requests were not
justified under section 9 of the Access to Informa
tion Act;
(c) the respondent's department acted unreason
ably in processing the access requests with only the
extended deadlines in mind, rather than processing
them, and each and every one of them as expedi
tiously as possible, and it thereby breached the
requirements of section 9 of the Access to Infor
mation Act;
(d) the respondent's department breached the
requirements of section 9 of that Act by invoking
the same 120-day extensions for all of the access
requests, even although the records were being
processed at the same time;
(e) the respondent's department breached the
requirements of section 9 by withholding records
ready for release until all the records had been
processed rather than releasing the records as they
became available;
(f) the Department acted negligently and igno
rantly outside of the spirit of the Act by obfuscat
ing (without malice) the reasons for the delays in
responding to the access requests during the course
of the Information Commissioner's investigation;
(g) the respondent's department's obfuscation
breached section 9 of the Act by evading any valid
reason for taking the 120-day extension, because,
in order to show that extensions are for "a reason
able period of time" pursuant to subsection 9(1) of
the Access to Information Act, the department
must state cogent, genuine reasons for the exten
sion, and for its length;
(h) being unjustified pursuant to section 9 of the
Act, the 120-day extensions amounted to deemed
refusals to disclose the requested records pursuant
to subsection 10(3) of the Access to Information
Act.
The Court will declare the effect of the above
findings in accordance with section 49 of the Act,
as sought by the applicant Commissioner. Ordi
narily costs follow the event, as stated in section
53, even although in this instance, one emanation
of the federal government, the Information Com
missioner, will be entitled to payment from
another, the Minister of External Affairs, both
emanations being supported by the taxpayers'
money. That may seem to be bizarre, but given the
important nature of the Commissioner's role in
society such disposition of costs was obviously
contemplated by Parliament. In any event such
disposition of costs may be seen to be somewhat
functional in that the Information Commissioner
retained outside counsel and, in view of her vindi
cation herein, the applicant's budget should not be
the government pool of taxpayers' money to bear
the party-and-party costs which the Court awards
in the applicant's favour. Costs will be paid by the
Minister out of his department's pool of taxpayers'
money. Thus, in accordance with subsection 53(1)
of the Act, do costs follow the event.
The applicant may write to the Court by letter,
to suggest the disposition of the "Confidential
Motion Record of the Applicant" (volume III),
after the expiry of an appropriate length of time.
The signed copy of these reasons shall be lodged
in file T-1042-86, and a photocopy shall be lodged
in each of files T-1090-86 and T-1200-86, to serve
for the Court's reasons therein.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.